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Chapter 1
Introduction
Anticipating the consequences of one’s action is a prerequisite for sensible choice. On
grounds of hypothetical states of the world, alternatives can be evaluated and decisions
can be taken. The quality of a choice, however, can only be evaluated ex post. When
discrepancies between anticipated and actual consequences have been revealed by time,
future expectations might be aligned. This observation supposedly holds true for the
aggregate. The course of an economic system is fundamentally driven by expectations.
Expectations, on the other hand, are driven by the course of the economy, if they are
not formed in a completely arbitrary way.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) note that systematic theories in which expectations play a
role began as early as Henry Thornton’s treatment of paper credit, published in 1802. In
the 1930s, as Hoover (1992) remarks, thoughtful discussions about economic behaviour
and about the role of expectations were prominent and the debates among Keynes, Hicks,
Hayek and others were subtle and full of detail. However, from today’s perspective a
notable feature is that their analysis was mainly conducted in words. The formalisation
of ideas was not attributed much relevance until Frisch (1933) and Tinbergen (1936)
pioneered the extensive use of mathematics in conducting a formal theory. Their work
is regarded as having marked the foundations of modern macroeconomics. From then
on, ideas about reasonable behaviour were captured in mathematical terms.
In the 1950s, economists started to explore the microeconomic behaviour that was pre-
sumed to lie behind economic aggregates.1 Relations, formerly assumed, were sought
1Important contributions in this respect were made by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Fried-
man (1957) working on the consumption function as well as Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) who
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to being explained by optimisation conditions. In a dynamic environment, optimal be-
haviour crucially rests on believes about upcoming states of the world. Thus, in course
of this exploration, expectations were also paid more interest.
One of the most successful proposals at that time, on how believes should be modelled,
was provided by Cagan (1956) and Friedman (1957).2 They suggested that expecta-
tions are updated in light of the most recently observed forecast error and formulated
the Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis (AEH). Despite being empirically tractable, the
AEH turned out to be unattractive from a theoretical point of view since the algorithm
required additional ad-hoc assumptions on a free parameter in order to provide a testable
theory. Micro-foundations were already extensively employed and optimising behaviour
regarded as being the grounds for individual choice. Expectations, however, being an
integral part of individual choice had an arbitrary component in Cagan and Friedman’s
formulation.
Muth (1960) was aware of this problem and suggested to consistently expand the con-
cept of optimising behaviour from the allocation of resources to that of the formation of
expectations. He examined the AEH and showed that the algorithm could be used as an
optimal estimator of some variable if and only if the variable under consideration was
following an integrated moving average process of order (1,1). In this case, the suppos-
edly free parameter of the algorithm was in fact uniquely determined by the structure
of the underlying stochastic process. In any other instance, however, predictions based
on adaptive expectations would be biased, implying that agents do not have access to
all pertinent information or that they do not learn sufficiently from the past.
In 1961, Muth offered the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) as an alternative.
He observed that dynamic economic models use public expectations of variables as in-
puts and concurrently generate predictions of those same variables. He argued that
agents should be expected to make use of the model if the prediction of the theory was
substantially better than the public expectation; since rationality has been assumed in
all other aspects of human behaviour. Each use of the model, however, would marginally
exploit the model’s information advantage. Thus, ultimately, informational differences
should be depressed to zero and Muth concludes: ” expectations of firms (or, more gen-
erally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the
provided micro-foundations for money demand equations, commonly used in Keynesian and Monetarist
macroeconomics at that time.
2Ezekiel (1938) was the first to analyse the role of expectations in a simple dynamic model. His
notion of naive expectations, however, overly simplified the information processing capacity of human
beings.
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same information set, about the prediction of the theory (or the ”objective” probability
distributions of outcomes)” (Muth, 1961, p. 3). Despite Muth’s convincing argumenta-
tion, his insight was largely neglected for a decade until Lucas (1972b) worked out the
implications of the REH for the Phillips curve. Hoover (1992) remarks that from this
initial spark a great fire raced through macroeconomics, which did not consume anything
completely but singed almost everything.3
In contemporary economic theory the REH is the predominant paradigm in expecta-
tion formation. Its popularity and widespread impact can be partly attributed to the
fact that Rational Expectations (RE) are consistent with the principle of optimising
behaviour, irrespective of the underlying stochastic process. Since the specific form of
the forecast is, by definition, endogenously determined by the structure of the problem,
RE are applicable to any dynamic environment. The theoretical convenience that dif-
ferent markets or systems do not have to be treated in completely different ways was
already pointed out by Muth (1960). Sargent (1993) characterises RE by the two com-
plementary requirements of individual rationality (i.e. that each agent is optimising an
objective function subject to some constraints) and mutual consistency of perceptions
(i.e. that the constraints perceived are mutually consistent). This definition most clearly
reveals that RE constitute an equilibrium concept lying at the very heart of competitive
(Walrasian) equilibria.
Note that RE crucially rest on the self-referential feature of economic models. Agents
form expectations by conditioning on the true probability distribution of the system
which in turn depends on these expectations. A rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
is therefore characterised by a self-fulfilling prophecy; or put differently, by a fixed point
in the self referential map linking subjective and objective dynamics.
Due to the strong informational and cognitive assumptions required by RE, Muth’s
hypothesis has also been subject to heavy critique. One of the most prominent objectors,
Simon (1986), reckoned that the judgement that certain behaviour is rational, can only
be reached by viewing the behaviour in the context of a set of givens. These include
the situation in which the action takes place, the goals the action is aimed at realising
and the computational possibilities which are available. Neoclassical economics mostly
assumes that information processing capacities are unlimited, that values of individuals
are given and consistent and most importantly, that an objective description of the
3The three great themes of new classical economics in the 1970s - Policy Ineffectiveness, Dynamic
Consistency and the Lucas Critique - can be seen as a natural extension of concerns expressed in Lucas’
article.
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world exists. Given these assumptions, it is consistent to not distinguish between the
real world and the decision maker’s perception of it. Thus, economists can accurately
predict the choices that will be made by individuals, entirely from their own knowledge
of the world.
Social sciences, on the other hand, have developed a large body of evidence on the bound-
edness of computational resources and knowledge (see e.g. Kirchler, 2011), suggesting
that constructivism is an integral part of our cognition. If this proposition is acknowl-
edged, then one must consequently distinguish between the real world and subjective
perceptions of it. This in turn pushes forward the need to reconsider the grounds ratio-
nality should be judged on. Economics has been inclined to view rationality in terms of
the choices it produces. Given that information-processing capacities as well as time and
patience are limited, the claim for an optimal result can hardly be maintained. In spite
of this observation, the notion of rationality has not to be abandoned. Simon (1982)
suggested to view rationality in terms of the processes it employs rather than the choices
it produces. He called for a procedural theory which not only includes the processes of
reasoning, but also the processes that generate the actor’s subjective representation of
the decision problem.
George Evans, Seppo Honkapohja and Thomas Sargent pioneered a strand of litera-
ture, known as adaptive learning, which reconciled the objections of Simon’s ”bounded
rationality” with Muth’s claim for a consistent economic theory (see e.g. Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001; Sargent, 1993). In contrast to the REH, equivalence of subjective
beliefs and actual dynamics is not imposed ex ante. Instead, agents are treated like
econometricians who face estimation and inference problems and expectations are mod-
elled as a projected image of the real world. By requiring that these projections generate
forecast errors that are orthogonal to agents’ forecasting models, rationality is still im-
posed; albeit in a procedural sense.4
This thesis reviews the implications of adaptive learning in the context of the New
Keynesian model. In the presence of frictions, price setting today crucially depends
upon beliefs about where prices are heading in the future, which in turn depends on
the course of monetary policy and possibly on the past. The New Keynesian model,
describing this interplay, therefore provides an excellent starting point to analyse the
relevance and implications of bounded rationality on policy recommendations.
4Branch (2006) provides a comprehensive review of the adaptive learning literature, emphasising that
beliefs which satisfy such a least squares orthogonality condition are in fact consistent with Muth’s
hypothesis.
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The thesis is organised as follows: The first chapter presents a short historical review
prior to a formal derivation of the New Keynesian model. The derivation will follow Pre-
ston (2006), who develops the model without imposing that expectations are rationale, ex
ante. Upon substitution of some general expectations operator with the mathematical
expectations operator, the framework will collapse to the standard two-equations re-
duced form representation of the New Keynesian model which is the standard workhorse
of contemporary monetary theory.
The second chapter will be concerned with closing the model. One consequence of
the Rational Expectations Revolution (see e.g. Hoover, 1992) was that authors started
to treat the monetary authority symmetrically with the public: as dynamic optimisers.
However, the maximum of a policy objective is characterised by a dynamic inconsistency.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) were the first to argue that this should be anticipated by
agents having RE. This line of reasoning gave rise to the distinction between two policy
regimes: One where the central bank is assumed to optimise each period, and another
one where the central bank can credibly commit to a rule. After having introduced these
ideas, the corresponding policy rules will be derived in the second chapter.
The third chapter of this thesis is devoted to contrasting RE with adaptive learning. In
spite of the REH’s brilliance, some critical issues remain unacknowledged in its original
formulation. In particular, a crucial question, intimately linked to the REH, is sought
to being answered by the concept of adaptive learning: How can agents come to possess
RE? Prior to establishing techniques in order to study whether adaptive learning serves
as a justification for some REE, the concept of determinacy will be introduced. The
chapter closes with a derivation of the reduced-form equations of the New Keynesian
model under the assumption of bounded rationality.
The concepts, clarified in the preceding chapter, will then be applied to the New Keyne-
sian model under optimal monetary policy in the fourth chapter. In course of reviewing
results on Taylor-type rules, the connection between determinacy and E-stability will be
analysed. Thereafter, the ”expectations-based” interest rate rule, as proposed by Evans
and Honkapohja (2003), will be analysed in detail.
The fifth chapter takes the assumption of bounded rationality on step further. The
Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE), formalising the notion that agents are pre-
dicting by means of misspecified models, is introduced in the context of optimal discre-
tionary policy. However, the form of misspecification in a RPE can easily be criticised
as being ad hoc. While there only exists one way to form expectations in a rational way,
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there exist many ways to form suboptimal expectations. The Misspecification Equilib-
rium (ME), extending the concept of a RPE by endogenising the underparameterisation,
will be presented as an interesting way to disintegrate the arbitrariness inherent to the
RPE.
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Chapter 2
The New Keynesian Model
”Keynes denies that there is an Invisible Hand channeling the self centered action of
each individual to the social optimum. This is the sum and substance of his heresy.”
(Samuelson, 1949, p. 192). In contrast to what Say’s Theorem postulated, Keynes (1936)
did not believe that supply would automatically create its own demand, but that the
economy could get trapped in an equilibrium where not all resources are used efficiently.
Optimal actions of individuals, he argued, do not necessarily lead to optimal allocations
in the aggregate and governmental intervention was therefore justified. Keynes ascribed
the soaring unemployment during the Great Depression to a lack of aggregate demand.
Due to fixed liquidity preferences, however, that he considered as being prevalent in
times of heavy unemployment, Keynes argued that central banks could not efficiently
intervene in the market equilibrium. Hicks (1939) captured Keynes’ reasoning in the
influential IS/LM model. By means of two simple relationships, one describing the
money demand, the other relating output and savings decisions, he interpreted Keynes’
general theory and therewith designed a framework which quickly became the dominant
vehicle for macroeconomic analysis.
Friedman (1968) notes that the wide acceptance of Keynes’ ideas meant that for some two
decades monetary policy was believed to have been rendered obsolete. Central banks’
main purpose was to keep interest rates at a low level in order to hold down interest
payments in the government budget. One of the major shortcomings of the IS/LM
model, however, was that it presumed a fixed, rigid price level and that it failed to
distinguish between nominal and real terms. As a consequence of cheap money policies,
inflation became a widespread phenomenon. Friedman notes that central banks were
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eventually forced to give up the pretence, that they could indefinitely keep the interest
rate at a low level.
Friedman (1968) notes that in the 60s, it was generally agreed on that an expansory
policy would tend to lower interest rates by making nominal cash balances higher than
people actually desired. As a result, spending would be stimulated. Producers were
believed to react to such an expansion by increasing output, the employed by working
longer hours and the unemployed by taking on jobs. Phelps (1968) and Friedman (1968),
however, argued on theoretical grounds that this so-called Phillips curve trade-off be-
tween unemployment and inflation would, if at all, hold in the short run.1 In the long
run, the neutrality of money would be maintained. Expectations played a crucial role
in the Friedman-Phelps critique.2
Lucas (1972b) gave Friedman’s insight an explicit theoretical foundation by combining
imperfect information, competitive markets and perfectly flexible prices in an overlapping
generations framework originally set up by Samuelson (1958). The basic idea of his model
was that unpredicted variations in money generate price movements that agents may
misinterpret as relative price movements. The decisive ingredient of Lucas’ island model,
however, was to assume that expectations are rational. This implied that any systematic
course in monetary policy would be fully incorporated into the decision rules of agents.
Only stochastic shocks to the money supply could cause output and employment to
deviate from its trend. In this way, Lucas reconciled the important real effects of money
in the short run, with its long run neutrality. Concurrently, he initiated the Rational
Expectations Revolution in macroeconomics.
1Phillips (1958) analysed the British economy over the period 1861-1957 and observed an inverse
relationship between money wage changes and the unemployment rate. As an explanation he offered the
simple principle that prices should be expected to rise if demand for a commodity exceeds its supply.
Moreover, the rise should be greater, the greater the excess in demand. Since wages are the price for labor
services, the same principle should be expected to operate in the determination of money-wage growth
rates. Phillips celebrated reasoning suggested that unemployment could be permanently decreased by
expanding demand and hence by higher inflation.
2Friedman noted that product prices typically respond faster to unanticipated changes in nominal
demand, than nominal wages do. Thus real wages would in fact decline if an expansion was taking
place. But since employees had accommodated to a certain level of prices and inflation in the past and
implicitly evaluated their wage on basis of these learned prices, they would be prone to misinterpret the
nominal wage increase as being one of real terms. This illusion, Friedman argued, was the very reason for
a decline in the rate of unemployment in the first place. Eventually, however, consumers would discover
that not only wages, but the general price level had increased. Consequently, they would adapt their
expectations about the future and request higher nominal wages. This would depress the employment
rate and eventually, real wages as well as unemployment should return to their natural levels which were
solely determined by real factors.
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Hoover (1992) remarks that one consequence of this development was a paper where
Lucas (1972a) outlined that the common practise for testing the natural rate hypothesis
was flawed. A frequent test was to regress unemployment on inflation and to analyse
whether the sum of coefficients on lagged inflation summed to zero. Lucas, however,
showed that the Phillips curve was no structural relationship as Keynesians had regarded
it, but that it was dependent on current policy rules. Thus, the long-run propensity
was in general not zero, unless monetary policy was conducted in a purely random
way.3
Another implication of Lucas’ work was the policy ineffectiveness proposition, demon-
strated by Sargent and Wallace (1976). They used a simple model that incorporated
Lucas’ basic assumptions to illustrate that a Phillips curve trade-off was only possible
if the public could systematically be fooled; only unanticipated changes in the money
supply would have a real effect on output. RE, however, uncovered the equilibrium to be
independent of any policy rule. Thus, even in the short run, activist policy, as suggested
by Keynes, would have no real effect.4 Walsh (2010) remarks that empirical evidence
suggests that the policy ineffectiveness hypothesis does not hold. Both anticipated and
unanticipated changes in the money supply seem to affect output and the choice of policy
rule is therefore not irrelevant for the behaviour of real economic activity.
A third consequence was the increased interest in policy rules instead of single policy
actions. Since RE implied that any systematic part of policy would be incorporated
into individual decision making, policy makers should account for those interactions in
the design of policies. By specifying an objective function for the monetary authority
and determining the values of the parameters in the policy rule that maximised the
expected value of this objective function, Hoover (1992) remarks that economists started
to treat policymakers symmetrically with the public; as maximisers. The policy rules
themselves, however, were independent of the reactions of the public and treated as
if they remained in place for all time. Kydland and Prescott (1977) pointed out that
policymakers may be subject to additional constraints when choosing an optimal rule:
absent enforcement, they argued, it may be optimal to deviate from the rule, once agents’
3In his critique, Lucas (1976, p.41) generalised this observation: ”Given that the structure of an
econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal rules vary
systematically with the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in
policy will systematically alter the structure of econometric models”. Thus, rational expectations, being
the consequence of optimising behaviour, implied that econometric policy evaluation was useless.
4It will be shown in the following that contemporaneous models are capable of explaining the empirical
evidence of a short run trade-off between unemployment and inflation despite their assumption of rational
expectations. This is due to the introduction of nominal price and wage rigidities
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decisions were taken. RE implied that this temptation would be anticipated by agents.
Hence, only a credible, time consistent rule would be incorporated into the decision
process of agents.
The standard approach in contemporaneous monetary economics and monetary policy
analysis has incorporated all of these historical developments. Since aggregate demand
is of central importance in these models and since they suggest that fluctuations can
and should be dampened by countercyclical policy, they are labeled Keynesian. One
of the major differences between modern and traditional Keynesian theories, however,
is that the latter regarded observed levels of employment, consumption and output as
constraints on households and firms, while the former regard them as the outcome of
dynamic optimisation decisions. Due to the use of dynamic optimisation techniques,
these models are labeled New Keynesian Models.
As Clarida et al. (1999) point out, New Keynesian model have much of the empirical
appeal of the traditional IS/LM models; yet they are grounded in dynamic general
equilibrium theory which was pioneered in the real business cycle (RBC) theory that
originated from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1982). Similar to RBC models,
New Keynesian models ordinarily assume that agents are representative and that their
expectations are rational. A key point of departure, however, is the explicit incorporation
of frictions. Due to market imperfections like price or wage rigidities, informational
frictions or portfolio frictions, equilibria in the New Keynesian model are not Pareto
efficient and monetary policy is therefore justified.5
2.1 The Framework
The derivation of the New Keynesian model is following Preston (2006) who essentially
uses a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model of Woodford (2003b). To simplify the expo-
sition, Woodford’s ”cash-less limit” is assumed, i.e. the model abstracts from monetary
frictions that would allow money to be held in equilibrium in spite of being dominated
in rate of return.
The model consists of representative households i, maximising utility and a continuum of
firms j ∈ [0, 1], maximising profits. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the single good,
5It will be shown in the following, that in the limiting case of perfect price flexibility, the new
Keynesian model boils down to a RBC model: Cycles are the consequence of optimisation and monetary
policy is only affecting nominal variables and thus negligible.
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commonly used in RBC models, is replaced by a continuum of differentiated products
which are offered by monopolistically competitive firms. The consumption bundle is
defined by
Cit =
(∫
Cit(j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
, (2.1)
where Ct(j) denotes the demand for a differentiated good produced by firm j and θ > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods. The corresponding price in-
dex Pt can be derived by assuming the artifice of a ”bundler” (see e.g. Chari et al.
(1996)). The bundler takes prices {Pt(j)|j ∈ [0, 1]} of consumption goods as given and
chooses a combination of differentiated products as to minimise total costs of consump-
tion
∫
P (j)tC(j)tdj subject to the constraint of providing some level of the consumption
bundle which is to be specified in the next section. Rearranging the first order condition
to this problem and making use of the definition of the consumption bundle shows that
the aggregated price index is given by
Pt =
(∫
Pt(j)
1−θdj
) 1
1−θ
.
Although the assumption of monopolistic competition would suffice to justify monetary
intervention, there was no scope for doing so. Any policy action would simultaneously
change all prices, leaving total output unaffected. Therefore, nominal frictions are in-
troduced by assuming that firms’ ability to adjust prices are constrained. The specific
model of price stickiness used here, is due to Calvo (1983) who assumes that oppor-
tunities to set prices arrive as an exogenous Poisson process: each period there is a
constant probability (1 − α) that prices may be adjusted. Demand curves and produc-
tion technologies are assumed to be identical across firms. Therefore, all firms having
the opportunity to set prices will choose to set the same price. Denoting the set of firms
re-optimising in period t by S(t) ⊂ [0, 1], it holds that Pt(j)∗ = P ∗t for all j ∈ S(t). The
remaining fraction α is a random sample of firms which did not adjust prices. It follows
that Pt(j) = Pt−1(j) for all j ∈ [0, 1]\S(t). Combining this insight with the definition of
aggregate prices gives
P 1−θt = (1− α)P ∗(1−θ)t + αP 1−θt−1 . (2.2)
In order to ease analytical handling, and in stark contrast to RBC models, capital is
left out of the analysis. While endogenous variations in the capital stock traditionally
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play a key role in real business cycle models, Cogley and Nason (1995) showed that the
response of investment to productivity shocks contributes little to the dynamics implied
by real business cycle models. Moreover, Walsh (2010) reports empirical evidence of
little correlation between output and capital stock at business cycle frequencies. Those
results justify neglecting the capital stock.
Households’ Optimisation Problem
There exists a single one-period risk-less non-monetary asset Bt in order to transfer
wealth inter-temporally. Defining wealth at the beginning of period t + 1 as Wt+1 =
(1 + it)B
i
t, households’ flow budget constraint is given by
W it+1
1 + it
+ PtC
i
t 6W it + PtY it . (2.3)
This relation states that expenditures, represented by the left hand side, must not exceed
available wealth, represented by the right hand side, in each period. Bond holdings yield
a nominal interest rate it. Real income Y
i
t derives from wage wt(j) for labor supplied to
firm j as well as from nominal profits Πt(j) from ownership of firms. Wages are paid on
a competitive market and each households owns the same diversified portfolio of firms.
Consequently, period nominal income is determined as
PtY
i
t =
∫ 1
0
[
wt(j)h
i
t(j) + Πt(j)
]
dj,
where hit(j) denotes the number of hours household i worked in period t for good j, for
each household i.
Households choose consumption bundles and labor supply in order to maximise future
expected discounted utility
Eit
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
U
(
CiT ; ξT
)− ∫ 1
0
v
(
hiT (j); ξT
)
dj
]
,
subject to their budget constraint (2.3). Preferences are defined over the composite
consumption bundle C, a vector of aggregate preference shocks ξ and the labour supply
hi(j). The discount factor is assumed to satisfy β ∈ (0, 1). The function v() captures
the disutility derived from work and is convex and increasing in the labor supply hit(j)
for a given value of ξt. The function U() is increasing and concave in the consumption
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bundle Ct, given some value of ξt.
The operator Eit denotes possibly non-rational subjective beliefs of household i about
the probability distribution of the models’ state variables. Expectations are assumed to
be homogenous across households.
Given an initial wealth endowment, the theory of dynamic programming implies that
households choose consumption bundles in order to satisfy a stochastic Euler equation
1
1 + it
= βEit
[
Pt
Pt+1
Uc(C
i
t+1, ξt+1)
Uc(Cit , ξt)
]
(2.4a)
and a corresponding transversality condition
lim
k→∞
Etβt+kUc(Cit+k, ξt+k)
Bt+k
Pt+k
= 0, (2.4b)
where the notation ∂f(a, b)/∂a = fa(), for any function f is used. These two relations
give necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal, interior, inter-temporal alloca-
tion of consumption. The Euler equation can be justified by a variational argument. A
marginal decrease in today’s consumption by ∆C units could be used to increase the
stock of bonds, yielding a real return of Pt/Pt+1(1 + it)∆C units in the next period.
At an optimum, this postponement of consumption must not have an effect on lifetime
utility. Taking account of the discount factor and uncertainty gives the Euler equa-
tion. Since there are no terminal conditions in the households optimisation problem,
the transversality condition (2.4b) has to be imposed as to guarantee optimality. There
might exist various paths of consumption, satisfying the Euler equation and in partic-
ular, there might be paths such that the present discounted real value of bonds is not
approaching zero as time goes to infinity. Those paths, however, can’t be optimal since
bond holdings yield no utility.
Optimal intra-temporal decisions are obtained when the marginal rate of substitution
between two commodities is equated to their marginal rate of transformation. The
price of decreasing disutility derived from work is wt(j), while the price of increasing
consumption is given by the aggregate price level Pt. Thus, for all j ∈ [0, 1] it must hold
that
vh(h
i
t(j), ξt)
Uc(Cit , ξt)
=
wt(j)
Pt
. (2.5)
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Furthermore, for the derivation of the optimal price setting rule, note that the consump-
tion bundle is chosen optimally. Thus, demand for good j is obeying
Cit(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
Cit , (2.6)
which follows from maximising (2.1) with respect to Ct(j) and subject to CtPt =∫
Ct(j)Pt(j)dj.
The Consumption Rule
To derive a consumption rule, the Euler-equation is linearised around a steady-state
which shall be characterised by ξt = 0 and Ct = C¯ for all t. Inspection of (2.4a) implies
that there exists a steady-state solution of the form Pt/Pt−1 = 1 and i¯t = β−1−1 for all t,
where the notation was introduced that Z¯ denotes the steady state value of some variable
Z. Furthermore, let z = ln(Z/Z¯) denote the log deviation of some variable Z around
the deterministic steady state and redefine the nominal interest rate, correspondingly, as
a percentage deviation it ≡ ln[(1 + it)/(1 + i¯)]. Then, log-linearising the Euler equation
(2.4a) shows that consumption decisions must approximately satisfy
ct = E
i
tct+1 − σ(it − Eitpit+1) + gt − Eitgt+1,
where pit = ln(Pt/Pt−1) denotes inflation and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
σ and gt are given by
σ ≡ − Uc(C¯, ξ)
Ucc(C¯; ξ)C¯
and gt = −UCξ(C¯, ξ)ξt
Ucc(C¯; ξ)C¯
. (2.7)
Under the assumption of RE, the linearised Euler-equation entailed all relevant informa-
tion for optimal choice. Ordinarily, the life-time budget constraint is therefore not explic-
itly used in deriving a reduced-form system and only required to hold ex-post. However,
if agents are not perfectly informed about the probability distribution of the economy,
implying that next period’s forecast does not depict an exhaustible description of state
dynamics, the budget constraint provides an important source of information.
In the appendix it is shown that the linearised Euler equation can be combined with the
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budget constraint as to obtain the optimal consumption rule
cit = (1− β)ω¯it + Eit
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
(1− β)yiT − βσ(iT − piT+1) + β(gT − gT+1)
]
, (2.8)
where ω¯ = W it /(PtY¯ ) denotes the share of a household’s real wealth as a fraction of
steady-state income Y¯ . Preston (2005) emphasises the similarity of this decision rule to
the predicted consumption allocation under the permanent income hypothesis. The first
two terms capture the basic insight of the permanent income hypothesis that agents
should consume a constant fraction of the expected future discounted wealth, given
a constant real interest rate equal to β−1 − 1. The third term arises from expected
fluctuations of the real interest rate which are either due to variations of the nominal
interest rate or due to inflation while the final term captures stochastic disturbances of
the economy and is due to the assumption of preference shocks.
Aggregate behaviour can be derived by integrating the optimal consumption rule (2.8)
over households i. Note therefore that market clearing implies
∫
ω¯itdi = 0 and let zt =∫
zitdi for any variable z. Specifically, let Et =
∫
Eitdi denote the average expectations
operator. Then, the aggregated consumption rule can be seen to follow
ct = Et
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
(1− β)yiT − βσ(iT − piT+1) + β(gT − gT+1)
]
.
Finally, noting that equilibrium requires ct = yt, aggregate demand shall be expressed
in terms of the output gap xt = yt − ynt , where the natural rate of output ynt will be
defined later. The current output gap can then be written as
xt = Et
∞∑
T=t
βT−t [(1− β)xT+1 − σ(iT − piT+1) + rnT ] , (2.9)
where rnt ≡ Et(ynt+1− gt+1)− (ynt − gt) denotes the composite of exogenous disturbances
in period t.
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Firms’ Optimisation Problem
There is a continuum of firms j ∈ [0, 1], producing diversified goods Yt(j) in period t,
with the non-linear production function
Yt(j) = Atf(ht(j)), (2.10)
where At denotes aggregate stochastic productivity disturbances and f() satisfies the
Inada-conditions. Labor is hired on competitive markets and is paid a real wage of
wt(j)/Pt for every unit hired in period t. Nominal profits for firm j in period t are
therefor given by
Πt(j) = YtP
θ
t Pt(j)
1−θ − wt(j)f−1(YtP θt Pt(j)−θ/At),
where the demand function (2.6) was used and f−1() denotes the inverse function of
f(). When setting prices Pt(j), firms are assumed to value future streams of income at
the marginal rate of aggregate income in terms of the marginal value of an additional
unit of income today. Thus, a unit of income in period T is valued by the stochastic
discount factor
Qt,T = β
T−t Pt
PT
Uc(YT , ξT )
Uc(Yt, ξt)
. (2.11)
The Euler-equation unveils that the stochastic discount factor is equivalent to 1/(1+it)
t,
given that each household consumes the same amount. Note that all agents are assumed
to have common beliefs and tastes and due to the assumption of owning the same diver-
sified portfolios it follows that in equilibrium, each household receives the same income
stream which is equal to aggregate income. This justifies the simplifying assumption
that firms value future profits at the marginal value of aggregate income.
Firms’ optimisation problem is to set a price Pt(j) as to maximise the expected present
discounted value of profits
Eit
∞∑
T=t
αT−tQt,T [Πt] ,
where αT−t reflects the possibility that prices may not be adjusted in period T and
therewith the relevance of this periods’ profit. Differentiation with respect to Pt(j) and
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substitution of (2.11) gives the first order condition
Eit
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−tUc(YT ; ξT )YTP θ−1T [Pt(j)
∗ − µPTΦt,T ] = 0, (2.12)
where µ = θ/(θ − 1) and Φt,T denotes real marginal costs in period T which are de-
pendent, through firm-specific demand, upon price setting in period t. By combining
households’ supply of labor (2.5) with the production function (2.10) real marginal costs
can be expressed as
Φ(Yt(j), Yt, ξ˜t) =
∂ht(j)
∂Yt(j)
wt(j)
Pt
=
1
fh(f−1(Yt(j)/At))At
vh(f
−1(Yt(j)/At), ξt)
Uc(Yt, ξt)
. (2.13)
This relation makes clear that individual production is dependent on firm specific as well
as aggregate conditions. The stochastic disturbance vector ξ˜ summarises technology and
taste shocks (At, ξt).
The Price Decision Rule
To begin with, consider the flexible price equilibrium (α = 0) which will prove useful
in the derivation of a linearised price decision rule. Optimal price setting (2.12) then
implies the following standard result of a model of monopolistic competition:
Pt(j)
∗
Pt
=
θ
θ − 1Φ(Yt(j), Yt, ξ˜t).
Firm j sets its price equal to a markup µ > 1 over its nominal marginal costs PtΦ, where
the size of the markup is determined by θ, the price elasticity of demand. As θ → ∞
the differentiated products become perfect substitutes and firm j’s profits are depressed
to zero.
Since the problem is symmetric it follows that Pt(j) = Pt and consequently that Yt(j) =
Yt for all j and t. Combining this insight with (2.12) shows that marginal costs in a
flexible price equilibrium are the same across firms and given by
Φn ≡ Φ(Y nt , Y nt , ξ˜t) = µ−1, (2.14)
where the output level Y nt satisfying this relation is, following Friedman, referred to
as natural output. Natural output varies under fully flexible prices in accordance with
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aggregate taste and productivity shocks ξ˜ and is independent of any policy rule. Even
in the absence of sticky prices this construct turns out to be a useful benchmark case
as will become evident below. Woodford (2003b) notes that the complete irrelevance
of monetary policy to the determination of real activity is a very special case. If one
allows for real balance effects or endogenous capital accumulation, the flexible price
equilibrium is affected by monetary policy. However, since these effects are not very
large in quantitative terms, the conclusions from this simple model remain essentially
correct.
The steady-state, around which the dynamics shall be linearised, is characterised by
ξ˜t = 0 and Yt = Y¯ for all t. Inspection of the price setting equation (2.12) indicates
that there exists a solution with Pt(j)/Pt = Pt/Pt−1 = 1, implying that marginal costs
in the steady-state are the same across firms and given by Φ¯ = Φ(Y¯ , Y¯ , 0) = µ−1. Thus,
the log deviation of firm j’s marginal costs around the steady state-value µ−1 can be
approximated by
φt,T (j) = ωyT (j) + σ
−1yT − (ω + σ−1)ynT ,
where σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, small letters, again, denote the
log-deviation of the corresponding variable around its deterministic steady-state, so that
e.g. φt,T (j) = ln(Φt,T (j)/Φ¯) and ω is the elasticity of real marginal costs of firm j with
respect to its own production
ω ≡ Y¯
[
vhh(Y¯ , 0)
vh(Y¯ , 0)
− f
′′(Y¯ )
f ′(Y¯ )2
]
. (2.15)
The double index on marginal costs emphasises that marginal costs in period T are
dependent upon prices set in t. To work out this dependency explicitly, note that real
marginal costs of producing aggregate output Yt are given by
φT = (ω + σ
−1)(yT − ynT ) = (ω + σ−1)xT ,
where the second equality implicitly defines the output gap xT = yT − ynT . To obtain a
relation to prices, approximate (2.6) to get yT (j) = yT −θ(pT (j)−pT ). This relation can
be combined with the above approximations to show that the dependence of marginal
supply costs upon a producer’s level of output is ultimately due to optimal price setting
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in period t
φt,T (j) = φT − ωθ(pt(j)∗ −
T∑
τ=t+1
piτ ),
where pt(j)
∗ = ln(Pt(j)∗/Pt) and pit = ln(Pt/Pt−1) denotes inflation. The term in
brackets (ln(Pt(j)
∗/PT )) shows that firm specific marginal costs differ from aggregate
marginal costs to the extent that firm specific prices differ from aggregate prices. With
this expression in hands, optimal price setting (2.12) can be approximated around the
deterministic steady state as
Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
{
p∗t −
[
φT − ωθ(pt(j)∗ −
T∑
τ=t+1
piτ ) +
T∑
τ=t+1
piτ
]}
= 0,
where the term in square brackets is the deviation of the log of PT /PtΦ(YT (j), YT , ξ˜)
from its steady state value of µ−1. Rearrangement of this expression gives the following
explicit solution for optimal price setting in t
pt(j)
∗ = Eit
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
1− αβ
1 + ωθ
(ω + σ−1)xT − piT
]
. (2.16)
Thus, the relative price chosen by firms who adjust their prices in period t is a function
of future expected paths of the output gap and inflation. Log linearisation of equation
(2.2) shows that aggregate price dynamics must approximately satisfy pit = (1− α)/αp∗t .
Thus, upon integration over i, the above relation may be rewritten as
pit = κxt + Et
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t [καβxT+1 + (1− α)βpiT+1] (2.17)
where
κ =
(1− α)
α
(1− αβ)
1 + ωθ
(ω + σ−1) > 0
Equation (2.17) indicates that current inflation is a function of the current output gap
and of future economic conditions. In contrast to traditional Phillips curves, the driving
variable of this process is not the log-deviation of current output from trend output but
the log deviation of real marginal costs from real marginal costs under flexible prices.
Since it is anticipated that prices may not be adjusted every period, firms must account
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for an expected rise in the general price level already today. Note that κ is decreasing
in β and α. Thus, the more weight agents are placing on the future and the more rigid
prices are, the less sensitive is inflation to variations in current marginal costs.
2.2 Aggregate Dynamics
Under the assumption that expectations are rational, the aggregate relations describing
the dynamics of the output gap (2.9) and inflation (2.17) can further be simplified by the
law of iterated expectations, since agents, having full knowledge of the tastes and beliefs
of other agents, are able to compute equilibrium probabilities and associated laws. This
section is following Clarida et al. (1999) in analysing aggregate dynamics in the New
Keynesian model.
Substitution of Et = Et, where Et denotes the mathematical conditional expectation, in
the price setting equation (2.17), applying the law of iterated expectations and quasi-
differencing yields the New Keynesian Phillips curve
pit = κxt + βEtpit+1, (2.18)
relating inflation positively to the output gap. As Clarida et al. (1999) point out, equa-
tion (2.18) has the flavour of a traditional expectations augmented Phillips curve. How-
ever, it differs from this relation with respect to two key aspects. First, in contrast to
the traditional Phillips curve, the coefficient on the output gap κ is restricted. In par-
ticular, it can be seen that κ is decreasing in α. Note that on average, prices are fixed
for 1/(1 − α) periods. Thus, the longer prices are fixed on average, the less sensitive
is inflation to movements in the output gap. Second, expected future inflation enters
additively as opposed to expected current inflation implying that (2.18) can be iterated
forward to give
pit = Et
∞∑
i=0
βiκxt+i. (2.19)
In contrast to traditional Phillips curves there is no arbitrary dependence on lagged
inflation. In the derivation of the model it was shown that the output gap is a measure of
the deviation of actual marginal costs from marginal costs in a flexible price equilibrium.
Thus, inflation depends entirely on current and expected economic conditions which are
reflected by the output gap.
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Most discussions of monetary policy give primary attention to two goals in terms of which
alternative policies should be evaluated. Maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation is
often regarded as the primary goal, central banks should be concerned with, while sta-
bilisation of output depicts the second goal. In practise, Svensson (2010) notes, inflation
targeting is never strict but always flexible in the sense that all inflation-targeting central
banks not only aim at stabilising inflation but also put some weight on the stabilisation
of economic activity. In section 2.3, grounds for these objectives will be discussed in
more detail.
Relation (2.19) indicates that, in order for monetary policy to be consistent with stable
prices, i.e. pit = 0 for all t, the output gap must be closed at all times, i.e. output must
be equal to natural output at all times. Woodford (2003b) reckons that the natural rate
of output is exactly the level of output for which real marginal costs of supplying each
good equal µ−1, i.e. the reciprocal of the desired gross mark-up. The latter quantity is
equal to marginal revenue for a firm adjusting its price in the case that all firms charge
the same price. Therefore Yt = Y
n
t is the condition needed so that no firm wishes to
charge a price different from the common price level and therewith guaranteeing zero
inflation for all times.
The implementation of such a policy can be analysed by means of the New Keynesian
IS curve
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(it − Etpit+1) + rnt (2.20)
which can be derived by applying the assumption of RE to expression (2.9). In contrast
to the traditional IS curve, equation (2.20) expresses the dependence of current output
on expected future output and the real interest rate.6 Since individuals seek to smooth
consumption, expectations of higher consumption next period lead to more output de-
mand today. The negative effect of the real rate of interest on current output reflects
inter-temporal substitution of consumption. Forward iteration of the New Keynesian IS
curve yields
xt = Et
∞∑
i=0
[−σ(it+i − pit+1+i) + rnt+i] ,
6According to the Fisher relation, the real interest rate equals the nominal rate of interest minus
expected inflation, i.e. rt = it−Etpit+1 where rt denotes the real interest rate. Thus the IS curve relates
the output gap inversely to the real interest rate.
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illustrating that current output not only depends on the current stochastic disturbance
and the real rate of interest, but also on an infinite series of all future real rates of interest
and stochastic disturbances. Substitution of pit = 0 for all t, shows that the nominal
interest rate it = σ
−1rnt is consistent with price stability. Woodford (2003b) therefore
interprets the stochastic disturbance σ−1rnt as deviations of the Wicksellian ”natural
rate of interest”, from the value consistent with a zero inflation steady state.
Note that both policy objectives can be attained in this framework since the single policy
instrument it succeeds in perfectly offsetting the single stochastic disturbance r
n
t . Due
to the assumptions made, a constant price level eliminates the distortions resulting from
price stickiness. The second best outcome yt = y
n
t for all times is then a consequence of
pit = 0 for all t.
2.3 Policy Objectives
Woodford (2003b) notes that there appears to be a fair amount of consensus that a
desirable monetary policy is one that achieves a low expected value of a discounted loss
function, where the losses are each period a weighted average of quadratic deviations
of inflation from some target and output from potential output. While this general
formulation is broadly accepted, there is ample space for discussions on details. Besides
the exact weights that should be placed on output stabilisation and inflation stabilisation
there exists also ambiguity on the measures representing these variables.
Hall and Mankiw (1997) proposed nominal income targeting, i.e. stabilising deviations
of the price level from a deterministic trend, while Svensson (1997) suggested to stabilise
deviations of the inflation rate from some target. An earlier alternative, money-growth
targeting, has been abandoned since practical experience has consistently shown that the
relation between money growth and inflation is too unstable and unreliable for money
growth targeting to provide successful inflation stabilisation (Svensson, 2010). Similarly,
there is the question of what output measure to stabilise. Should one stabilise deviations
of output from potential output which varies in accordance with real disturbances, or
should one stabilise deviations from a deterministic trend?
In order to be completely coherent in formulating the policy objective, Woodford (2003b)
derives a loss function from a second-order Taylor series approximation to the level
of expected utility of a representative household.7 This utility-based welfare criterion
7Clarida et al. (1999) reckon that the approach of deriving a welfare criterion by means of the utility
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not only provides justification for the general concern of price and output stabilisation
but furthermore, provides an exact answer to the questions raised about the precise
formulation of the appropriate loss function.
The reason for Woodford’s resort to a quadratic approximation approach are twofold.
The first is mathematical convenience. By using a quadratic expansion to the objective
function and linear approximations to the structural equations, the nature of optimal
policy can be analysed within a linear-quadratic optimal control framework which has
been extensively studied. The second reason is comparability. Traditional literature
on monetary policy evaluation almost always assumes a quadratic loss function. By
deriving a similar objective from an optimising framework allows to discuss similarities
and differences.
This section is following Woodford (2003b) in deriving the policy objective. The pro-
duction function (2.10) together with market clearing implies that instantaneous utility
of a representative household in period t can be expressed in terms of output as
Ut = U(Yt; ξt)−
∫ 1
0
v˜(Yt(j); ξ˜t)dj, (2.21)
where v˜(y; ξ˜) ≡ v(f−1(y/A), ξ) and Yt is defined by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (2.1).
Note that the definition of v˜() implies that marginal costs may be written as
Φ(Yt(j), Yt, ξ˜) =
v˜y(Yt(j), ξ˜)
Uc(Yt, ξ)
, (2.22)
where ξ˜ = (A, ξ). Prior to seeking an approximation to instantaneous utility, the efficient
level of output shall be characterised as to motivate grounds for policy intervention. The
function Ut is strictly increasing and concave in Yt(j) and attaining a maximum at
Φ(Yt(j), Yt, ξ˜) =
[
Yt
Yt(j)
]1/θ
for all j. (2.23)
This condition states that it is optimal to produce the same amount of each differentiated
good, i.e. Yt(j) = Yt for all j, and consequently that the marginal rate of transformation
vh(h, ξ)Uy(Yt, ξ)
−1 is equated to the average marginal product of labour Atf ′(h), at an
function has some major shortcomings. First, important effects like the uncertainty inflation generates for
lifetime financial planning and for business planning seems not to be captured by this approach. Second,
while the representative agent approach may work reasonably well to motivate behavioural relationships,
it could be highly misleading for welfare analysis if insurance and credit markets are incomplete and some
groups are suffering more in recessions than others.
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optimum. However, the New Keynesian model, as introduced above, is characterised
by two market distortions which cause a departure from these efficiency conditions. In
order to analyse their implications separately assume for the moment that prices may
be adjusted each period.
In a flexible price equilibrium it holds that Yt(j) = Yt for all t. From (2.23) it then
follows that Φ(Y et , Y
e
t , ξ˜t) = 1, where Y
e
t denotes the efficient level of output. However,
comparing this result to marginal costs under flexible prices (2.14) gives
Φ(Y nt , Y
n
t , ξ˜) = µ
−1 < 1 = Φ(Y et , Y
e
t , ξ˜).
Since Φ() is increasing in its first argument, the inequality indicates that the natural rate
of output is inefficiently low. The wedge between society’s marginal costs of producing
the consumption bundle and the household’s marginal costs of acquiring it drives total
output and hence employment below a socially desirable level. The reason for this
inefficiency lies in the fact that each firm perceives the demand for its differentiated
goods to be imperfectly elastic. The hereby implied market power leads to pricing above
marginal costs.
To analyse a series of economies where distortions become progressively smaller, the
parameter ϕ is introduced to summarise the overall distortion in the steady-state level
of output which may be due to market power and possibly taxes, so that
Φ(Y¯ , Y¯ , 0) =
1− τ
µ
≡ 1− ϕ, (2.24)
where τ denotes taxes. Given that the distortion is small, i.e. the level of output in
the steady state is nearly efficient, a log linear approximation of marginal costs around
the efficient level of output (and in the absence of real disturbances) may be used to
write
ln(Y¯ /Y¯ e) = −(ω + σ−1)−1ϕ. (2.25)
To examine the effect of staggered price setting, suppose that e.g. an employment subsidy
was placed so that Φ(Y¯ , Y¯ , 0) = 1. If not all firms are able to adjust prices each period,
then in general it holds that P (j) 6= P (i) for some (i, j). Households maximisation
behaviour requires in this case that consumption of more expensive goods is reduced in
order to afford an increased consumption of cheaper products and thus Yt(j) 6= Yt for
some j. Due to the decreasing marginal utility of consumption, the gain derived from
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increasing one variety is not able to offset the disutility suffered from a proportional
reduction of another variety. This in turn implies that the economy’s average marginal
product of labour does not equal the marginal rate of transformation. It is through this
channel that price stability affects welfare, i.e. that it violates efficiency condition (2.23),
even in the absence of monopoly power or distortionary taxes ϕ = 0.
To obtain more detailed results, households’ utility shall now be approximated around a
deterministic steady state with Yt(j) = Y¯ and ξ˜t = (0, 1) for all t and j. The first term
of instantaneous utility (2.21) can be shown to obey
U(Yt, ξt) ≈ Y¯ Uc(Y¯ , 0)
[
yt +
1
2
(1− σ−1)y2t + σ−1gtyt
]
+ t.i.p., (2.26)
where t.i.p summarises constants and exogenous variables which are independent of
policy and the notation yt = ln(Yt/Y¯ ) was used. Similarly, the second term in (2.21)
may be approximated by
v˜(Yt(j), ξt) ≈ Y¯ Uc(Y¯ , 0)
[
(1− ϕ)yt(j) + 1
2
(1 + ω)yt(j)
2 − ωqtyt(j)
]
+ t.i.p., (2.27)
where
qt = − v˜yξ(Y¯ , 0)ξt
Y¯ v˜yy(Y¯ , 0)
and the definition (2.24) was used together with (2.22) to replace v˜h(Y¯ , x˜i) with Uc(Y¯ , 0)(1−
ϕ). Furthermore, assuming that ϕ is close to zero, expression (2.27) was simplified by
approximating (1− ϕ)z with z for z small.
Note that the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (2.1) can be approximated by
yt = Eyt(j) +
1
2
(1− θ−1) var yt(j),
where Eyt(j) =
∫
yt(j)dj denotes the mean of yt(j) and var yt(j) denotes the correspond-
ing variance. With this relation in hands, aggregate disutility derived from work can
be approximated by integrating (2.27) over j and substituting for Eyt(j) and Eyt(j)2 to
obtain∫ 1
0
v˜h(Yt(j); ξt)dj = Y¯ Uc(Y¯ , 0)
[
(1− ϕ)yt + 1
2
(1 + ω)y2t − ωqtyt +
1
2
(θ−1 + ω) var yt(j)
]
+ t.i.p.
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Combining expressions this expression with (2.26) shows that instantaneous utility fol-
lows
Ut = − Y¯ Uc
2
(σ−1 + ω)
[
(xt − x)2 + var yt(j)
]
+ t.i.p, (2.28)
where x ≡ ln(Y¯ e/Y¯ ) denotes the gap between the steady state efficient level of output
and the actual steady state level of output as defined in (2.25).
Relation (2.28) constitutes a second order approximation to household’s utility under
the assumption that the natural rate of output is almost efficient (ϕ ≈ 0). It is evident
from this relation that monetary policy should be concerned with stabilising the output
gap, rather than output relative to trend and such that actual output is at an efficient
level. Moreover, expression (2.28) indicates that the dispersion of output levels across
differentiated products matters. As mentioned earlier, this results from the concavity of
the utility function together with the definition of the consumption bundle. Preference
and technology disturbances ξ˜ matter only through their effect on the natural rate of
output ynt which is captured in the definition of the output gap xt = yt − ynt .
The variability of output levels is grounded in the assumption of sticky prices. Therefore,
a second order approximation to the demand curve (2.6) is used to rewrite the dispersion
of output levels in terms of prices as
var yt(j) = θ
2 var pt(j).
This implies that in addition to the stabilisation of the output gap, optimal monetary
policy should also be concerned with reducing price dispersion. By making use of the
Calvo-pricing assumption, it is shown in the appendix that price dispersion may be
written in terms of inflation as
var pt(j) = α var pt−1(j) +
α
1− αpi
2
t .
Thus, in the framework derived above, stabilisation of the general price level is a sufficient
condition to achieve the policy objective of a minimal dispersion of output levels. If an
environment is created in which firms, choosing an optimal price, have no incentive to
set a price which deviates from the average of existing prices, the average of existing
prices will remain the same and eventually, all prices will collapse to being the same
value.
Substitution of this expression into the linearised utility function (2.28) shows that the
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normalised loss function is given by
∞∑
t=0
βtUt = −Ω
∞∑
t=0
βt[pi2t + λ(xt − x∗)] (2.29)
where Ω summarises constants and terms which are independent of policy and the relative
weight on the output gap stabilisation is given by λ = κ/θ.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Monetary Policy
The policy objectives of stabilising inflation at zero as well stabilising the deviation
of output from an efficient level emerged from the analysis of the preceding chapter.
In section 2.2 it was illustrated that there is no conflict in achieving these objectives
simultaneously, in the basic framework, by holding the price level fixed. However, there
are a number of caveats to this conclusion.
First of all, zero inflation may not be desirable. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2010) note
that the optimal long-run rate of inflation is governed by two sources of monetary non-
neutrality. While one source is a nominal friction stemming from a demand for fiat
money, the other source is given by the assumption of price-stickiness. The New Keyne-
sian model, as derived above, concentrates on the role of sticky prices. Staggered price
setting implies that higher inflation leads to higher price dispersion which causes an
inefficient allocation of resources. The optimum of zero inflation directly follows. The
role of money as a medium of exchanged, however, is neglected.
Friedman (1969) emphasised that money balances represent a service to the public which
is provided by the government at no cost. As to maximise public welfare, he suggested
to equate the real rate of returns to money and other assets by either conducting a
deflationary monetary policy or by paying interest on nominal money balances. Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2010) show that in monetary models where the demand for money
constitutes the only nominal friction, optimal monetary policy implies inflation targets
between −2% and −4%.
However, analysing monetary policy in an open economy introduces another channel
through which inflation affects welfare. Countries whose currency is used abroad may
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have an incentive to increase inflation as a means to collect resources from foreign res-
idents. This particularly provides a strong rationale for countries where the bulk of
currency circulates abroad (e.g. USA). Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2010) analyse the op-
timal rate of inflation in an economy where the foreign demand for its currency is taken
into account and show that the Friedman rule ceases to be Ramsey optimal. Calibrated
versions of the model deliver optimal rates of inflation between 2% and 10%.
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe conclude that models in which transactional demand for money
is the sole source of nominal frictions fail to provide a compelling explanation for the
magnitude of observed inflation targets which are concentrated at around 2% a year.
While sticky price frictions, as incorporated in the New Keynesian model, bring the
optimal rate of inflation much closer to observed inflation targets, the prediction of zero
inflation still falls short of empirics.
An argument which has been proposed as an explanation to this gap is the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates. In order to implement optimal monetary policy, the
nominal interest rate has to be adapted in response to the natural rate of interest which
in turn is dependent upon real economic activity. However, it might turn out that at
some time the natural rate of interest is negative, requiring the nominal interest rate to
be negative too which is not possible under any policy (Woodford, 2003b).1 Thus, zero
inflation may not be a feasible objective.
As Christiano et al. (2009) emphasise, hitting the zero bound on nominal interest rates
induces a deflationary mechanism which leads to increased volatility and therefore large
welfare costs. A positive inflation target, on the other hand, eases the implementation
of monetary policy by broadening the room for action. Coibion et al. (2012) derive the
effects of non zero steady-state inflation on the loss function and show that hitting the
zero bound is more costly, in their New Keynesian framework, than the welfare costs
of constant positive inflation. Their main conclusion is that the optimal inflation rate
is between 1% and 2%, or approximately the inflation targeting range used by the US
Federal Reserve and the ECB.2
1McCallum (2011), on the other hand, questions the existence of a zero lower bound by drawing on
modern technology institutions which could be designed so as to permit payment of negative nominal
interest rates.
2Due to the difficulty of providing further monetary stimulus when the interest rate is at its zero lower
bound, the appropriateness of the widely used 2% target has become subject to discussion recently. In
light of the current economic crisis and the server constraints on monetary policy associated with a zero
nominal interest rate, Olivier Blanchard, director of research of the International Monetary Fund, put
forth the idea of raising the target to 4%.
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To analyse the effects of this widely used inflation target, this chapter will make use of
a slightly modified policy objective which is given by
L = −1
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
(pit+i − pi)2 + α(xt+i − x)2
)
, (3.1)
where x allows for a possible deviation of socially optimal output from potential out-
put and pi > 0 is the target value for the inflation rate and the central banks ”taste”
parameter is from now on denoted by α. A policy with α = 0 is called strict inflation
targeting, while α > 0 is referred to as flexible inflation targeting.
Another qualification to the observation that it suffices to hold the price level fixed
in order to attain a welfare maximising allocation, is that this result is based on a
framework where the flexible price equilibrium differed from the efficient allocation by a
small constant factor only. However, if the inefficiency of the flexible price equilibrium
becomes time varying, e.g. due to time varying market power or time varying distorting
taxes, optimal pricing decisions will be altered and consequently, a constant price level
will in general not minimise the variability of the gap between actual output and efficient
output.
To counteract this shortcoming, a more general specification of the Phillips curve will be
analysed. In particular, the Phillips curve shall be supplemented by a stochastic term.
Optimal monetary policy is discussed in an environment where aggregate dynamics are
given by
xt = Etxt+1 − σ (it − Etpit+1) + rt, (3.2a)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt + ut, (3.2b)
where ut denotes a stochastic cost shock and the stochastic term r
n
t can in general arise
from preference shocks, fluctuations in the natural rate of output or shocks to government
purchases of goods (Walsh, 2010).3 This chapter will refer to relation (3.2a) and (3.2b)
as IS curve and Phillips curve, respectively and abstain from indicating the equation
3Clarida et al. (2002) suggest to introduce a stochastic term in the inflation equation by adding a
stochastic wage mark-up. Erceg et al. (2000), on the other hand, provide theoretical foundations for a
shifting Phillips curve by considering nominal wage stickiness. In recent models, Walsh (2010) notes,
stochastic disturbances are introduced by assuming that individual firms face random variations in the
price elasticity of demand, i.e. θt becomes time-varying.
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counter. The shocks are assumed to follow stable AR(1) processes
rnt = µrt−1 + rˆt
ut = ρut−1 + uˆt
(3.3)
with µ, ρ ∈ (0, 1) and both uˆt and rˆt are i.i.d. random variables with zero mean and
variance σ2u and σ
2
r respectively.
In the presence of cost push shocks, i.e. when the Phillips curve is supplemented with
a stochastic term, the policy objectives of stabilising inflation and the output gap, can
no longer mutually be achieved by holding the output gap closed at all times. Instead,
it will be shown in the following that a shifting Phillips curve introduces a trade-off in
achieving these policy objectives. Thus, the policy instrument it has to be designed such
that the target variables are simultaneously controlled for.
An optimal policy is a feedback rule which relates the state of the economy, represented
by (3.2), to the policy instrument it such that (3.1) is maximised. In the preceding
section it was shown that equilibrium values of the target variables do not only depend
on current policy measures, but also on expectations about future policy actions due to
their effect on future marginal costs. Woodford therefore describes central banking as
a management of expectations: Monetary policy uses the forward looking behaviour of
the private sector as a tool for stabilisation.
3.1 Discretionary Policy and Commitment
In the literature two regimes of central banking are distinguished. The first corresponds
to an environment where the monetary authority assumes that its policy choice effec-
tively determines agents’ expectations. The central bank therefore faces a dynamic
optimisation problem of maximising (3.1) with respect to the economy’s state variables,
pit and xt for all t, subject to aggregate dynamics (3.2). Note that the IS curve is not
directly dependent upon current values of inflation. Thus, the maximisation problem
can be dealt with in two stages: In the first stage, the loss function is maximised with
respect to inflation and the output gap and such that the Philips curve is satisfied for
all times. The hereby obtained optimal paths of the target variables can then be used
in the second stage where the IS curve is solved for the implied optimal nominal interest
rate.
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The first stage problem can be summarised by the Lagrangian
L = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
{
−1
2
[
(pit+i − pi)2 + α(xt+i − x)2
]
+ δt+i (pit+i − βpit+1+i − κxt+i − ut+i)
}
,
where δt+i denotes the state contingent multiplier associated with the constraint at t+ i.
The first order conditions for an inter-temporal optimum, usually called the commitment
solution, are given by
α(xt+i − x) + δt+iκ = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . (3.4a)
(pit+i − pi) + δt+i−1 − δt+i = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . (3.4b)
and
(pit − pi)− δt = 0. (3.4c)
These conditions characterise optimal behaviour of the central bank. However, it is
evident that the restriction on current inflation differs from the restrictions on future
inflation. Combining (3.4a) with (3.4c) gives the optimal trade-off for current state
variables to obey
(xt − x) = −κ
α
(pit − pi). (3.5)
Thus, if inflation is deviating from its target value of pi in the current period, it is optimal
to drive output in the opposite direction. The strength of the reaction depends on the
gain of reduced inflation per unit of output lost κ and inversely on the relative weight
placed on the output target α. For all future periods, the optimal plan can be obtained
by combining (3.4a) and (3.4b) which gives
(xt+i − xt+i−1) = −κ
α
(pit+i − pi) for i = 1, 2 . . . . (3.6)
In contrast to current period’s optimality condition (3.5), this relation requires to adjust
inflation in response to a change in the output gap. The target value for the output gap
becomes irrelevant.
To interpret these conditions, suppose that a positive cost push shock has realised. An
optimal reaction to this shock drives current output below its target value in order to
counteract inflation through the Phillips curve. Relation (3.6) represents the supposedly
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credible threat that output will be further reduced as long as inflation remains above its
target. The Phillips curve reveals that this threat has the immediate effect of dampening
current inflation. Monetary policy under commitment therefore turns out to be more
effective.
The strategy works since the public is assumed to integrate the policy rules into their own
decision process. However, the above result also makes the time inconsistency, inherent
to monetary policy under commitment, evident. Current decisions place a constraint on
the future which is non-optimal when the future actually arrives. If the central bank
was able to re-optimise in period t + 1, it would choose to deviate from (3.6). In the
aftermath of the Rational Expectations Revolution, Kydland and Prescott (1977) were
the first to point out that agents should be expected to anticipate the central bank’s
incentive to deviate from its plan and consequently not consider (3.6) when taking their
decisions. Credibility becomes a central issue in such an environment. One solution for
creating a consistent plan, known as the timeless perspective solution, is to neglect the
current constraint and fully commit to
α(xt − xt−1) = −κ(pit − pi) for all t. (3.7)
This relation will depict the grounds for deriving optimal interest rate rules under com-
mitment in the following section.
The second policy regime, being discussed in the literature, corresponds to an environ-
ment where the central bank is acting under discretion since it can’t credibly manipulate
agents’ believes. The in general dynamic optimisation problem reduces to a sequence of
static optimisation problems in this case. Each period, the central bank is maximising
its objective function (3.1) subject to the Phillips curve, whilst treating expectations of
future inflation as given. The first order condition to this problem takes the familiar
form
α(xt − x) = −κ(pit − pi) for all t. (3.8)
Since the monetary authority has no incentive to change the plan (3.8) in an unexpected
way, discretionary policy is said to be time consistent.
Taylor (1977) addressed the problem of distinguishing ”rule like” from discretionary
policy behaviour in practise. Recognising that no central bank would set its policy
instrument according to some simple formula, Taylor suggested to characterise rule-
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like behaviour by being systematic. McCallum (1993), on the other hand, reckoned
that central bankers who act under discretion would not characterise their behaviour as
unsystematic. He therefore argued that optimising once as opposed to optimising each
period should be regarded as an additional criterion for rule-like behaviour.4
While the distinction of these policy regimes is of interest in its own right, a considerably
more important point concerns the feasibility of rule-like behaviour. While commitment
will generate superior outcomes, its implementation requires to adopt instrument settings
which differ from those, emerging if the central bank was able to re-optimise each period.
Since there is no ”commitment technology” to guarantee the implementation of interest
rate settings, some authors (see e.g. Chari et al., 1989) consider central banks to be
inevitably destined to behave in a discretionary fashion.
In the following, the implementation of equilibria, being associated with optimal be-
haviour of the central bank, will be discussed.
3.2 Expectations-Based Interest Rate Rules
One strategy for deriving an interest rate rule is to combine the assumption of RE with
the method of undetermined coefficients in order to find a solution of the state vari-
ables which satisfies one of the first order conditions as well as the system of equations,
describing the state dynamics, simultaneously. This practise will be illustrated below.
Alternatively, the interest rate specification can be established whilst abstaining from
the assumption that expectations are rational. Following Berardi and Duffy (2007) who
retrace Evans and Honkapohja (2003), this approach will be illustrated here.
Consider the case of discretionary policy first. The Phillips curve can be combined
with the first order condition for discretionary policy (3.8) in order to give a first order
difference equation in the inflation rate
pit =
κ(αx+ κpi)
α+ κ2
+
αβ
α+ κ2
Etpit+1 +
α
α+ κ2
ut. (3.9a)
4The work by Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered to having put an end to the notion that policy
rules necessarily are linked to fixed settings for nominal interest rates. McCallum (1997) notes that this
step served to separate the ”rules vs. discretion” dichotomy from the issue of ”activist vs. non-activist”
policy behaviour and therewith, opened the door to possible interest in policy rules, on the part of
central bankers. Recently, studies on policy rules have experienced an upsurge, partly due to the arrival
of inflation targeting as ”a leading candidate for the provision of a practical guideline for monetary
policy”, as remarked by McCallum.
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Making use of the optimality condition (3.8) once more allows to express the output gap
as function of inflation expectations and the cost shock
xt =
αx+ κpi
α+ κ2
− κβ
α+ κ2
Etpit+1 − κ
α+ κ2
ut. (3.9b)
Substitution of these relations into the New Keynesian IS curve and solving for it gives
the relevant optimal policy rule to be
it = δ0 + δ1Etpit+1 + δ2Etxt+1 + δ3rt + δ4ut, (3.10)
with coefficients
δ0 = − κp¯i + αx¯
(α+ κ2)σ
, δ1 = 1 +
κβ
(α+ κ2)σ
, δ2 = δ3 =
1
σ
, δ4 =
κ
(α+ κ2)σ
. (3.11)
Evans and Honkapohja (2003) refer to relation (3.10) as the expectations-based opti-
mal interest rate rule under discretion as it is assumed that the monetary authority
conditions its policy on private sector forecasts and that it has ready access to such
information.
Under commitment, a similar specification can be obtained by combining the optimality
condition (3.7) with the Phillips curve to get the expectational difference equation
xt =
κ
α+ κ2
(
pi +
α
κ
xt−1 − βEtpit+1 − ut
)
. (3.12)
Substitution into the IS curve shows that the expectations-based optimal interest rate
rule under commitment is given by
it = φ0 + φ1xt−1 + φ2Etpit+1 + φ3Etxt+1 + φ4rt + φ5ut (3.13)
with parameters
φ0 =
−κp¯i
σ(α+ κ2)
, φ1 =
−α
σ(α+ κ2)
, φ2 = 1 +
κβ
σ(α+ κ2)
, φ3 = φ4 =
1
σ
, φ5 =
κ
σ(α+ κ2)
.
In chapter 5 it will be shown that these interest rate rules leave the corresponding REE
determinate and learnable. The intuition for the learnability result is straight-forward:
In contrast to the below derived fundamentals-based interest rate rules, the central bank
directly responds to possibly non-rational expectations in (3.10) and (3.13). Deviations
of subjective beliefs from RE are therefore efficiently counteracted.
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Similar interest rate rules, being conditioned on current or future expectations, have been
proposed by various authors; yet for different reasons. While some have been proposed
on grounds of the observation that contemporaneous data is ordinarily not available
(McCallum, 1997) (hence the practical consideration to rely on expected values), oth-
ers have been put forward in order to counteract the long transmission mechanism of
monetary policy (Svensson, 1999a).5
3.3 The Rational Expectations Equilibrium
After having specified the expectations-based form of interest rate rules, the standard
practise in deriving the optimal policy instrument shall be retraced. With the assumption
of RE in hands, an explicit solution to the set of expectational difference equations
(3.9) and (3.12) can be obtained by the method of undetermined coefficients. Upon
specification of the RE equilibrium process, the corresponding interest rate rule arises
from the definition of the IS-curve.
Following McCallum (1981), the particular solution of the expectational difference equa-
tions shall be conditioned on a minimal set of predetermined variables. The hereby
obtained minimal state variable (MSV) solution is unique by construction.6 Problems
associated with indeterminacy, i.e. an infinity of RE solutions, will be discussed in detail
in section 4.2.
Discretionary Policy
Under discretionary policy, the expectations-based rule (3.10) implies that the MSV
solution takes the form
xt = a¯x + c¯xut,
pit = a¯pi + c¯piut,
(3.14)
5Svensson (1999a) notes that monetary policy affects the demand side of the economy with a lag,
via its effect on the short real interest rate. Aggregate demand then affects inflation with another lag,
via the Phillips curve. The ”expectations channel” in the Phillips curve, allows to affect inflation with
a single lag. Svensson (1998) gives a simple example of a transmission mechanism. Aggregate demand,
in this model, is affected with a one-year lag, inflation with a two-year lag.
6In fact, this one provision is not sufficient to yield a unique solution in all cases, as will be shown in
section 4.3. In addition, the solution formulae must be valid for all admissible parameter values.
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where the coefficients (a¯x, a¯pi) and (c¯x, c¯pi) are presently undetermined. Making use of
the definition of the stochastic processes (3.3) shows that RE are given by
Etxt+1 = a¯x + c¯xρut,
Etpit+1 = a¯pi + c¯piρut.
(3.15)
Substituting (3.14) and (3.15) into the expectational difference equations (3.9) and solv-
ing for the coefficients yields
a¯x =
(αx+ κpi)(1− β)
α(1− β) + κ2 , c¯x = −
κ
α(1− βρ) + κ2 ,
a¯pi =
κ(κpi + αx)
α(1− β) + κ2 , c¯pi =
α
α(1− βρ) + κ2 .
(3.16)
The REE of the economic system under discretionary optimal policy is fully specified by
the relations (3.14) and (3.16) together with the specification of the exogenous process
ut.
Commitment
Under Commitment, the expectational difference equation (3.12) implies that current
inflation and output realisations are dependent upon recent output gaps xt−1. Since the
cost shock ut represents another predetermined variable in (3.12), a minimal set of state
variables is given by {1, xt−1, ut}. Thus, a solution of the form
xt = a˜x + b˜xxt−1 + c˜xut
pit = a˜pi + b˜pixt−1 + c˜piut
(3.17)
is conjectured. By making use the definition of the stochastic process (3.3), one obtains
RE to follow
Etxt+1 = a˜x(1 + b˜x) + b˜2xxt−1 + c˜x(b˜x + ρ)ut,
Etpit+1 = a˜pi + b˜pia˜x + b˜pi b˜xxt−1 + (b˜pi c˜x + c˜piρ)ut.
(3.18)
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Substitution of the conjectured solution (3.17) and the hereby implied expectations (3.18)
into the Phillips curve gives
a˜pi = β(a˜pi + b˜pia˜x) + κa˜x
b˜pi = βb˜pi b˜x + κb˜x,
c˜pi = β(b˜pi c˜x + c˜piρ) + κc˜x + 1,
(3.19)
whereas substitution into the first order condition (3.7) implies
a˜pi = pi,
b˜pi = −ακ−1(b˜x − 1),
c˜pi = −ακ−1c˜x.
(3.20)
These equations determine the presently unknown coefficients in (3.17). Combining
the second equation in (3.19) and (3.20), respectively, gives the following quadratic in
b˜x
βb˜2x − γb˜x + 1 = 0
where γ = 1 + β + κ/α. The succession of signs suggests that the quadratic has two
positive roots. Furthermore, note that their product is equal to 1 implying a recipro-
cal pair where one solution generates explosive time paths that eventually violate the
transversality condition. Therefore, the only relevant solution for b˜x is given by
b˜x =
1
2β
[
γ − (γ2 − 4β)1/2] .
The coefficient a˜x can be obtained by combining the first equation in (3.19) with the
first equation in (3.20) while c˜x can be expressed in terms of b˜x by combining the third
equations in these sets, respectively. This yields
a˜x =
κpi(1− β)
αβ(1− b˜x) + κ2
, and c˜x = − κ
α(1− ρβ) + αβ(1− b˜x) + κ2
.
The coefficients for the inflation process follow from (3.20).
Note that 0 < b˜x < 1, implying that even in the absence of a natural source of per-
sistence (i.e., ρ = 0) there is inertia in the output process as well as in the inflation
process. This result is a consequence of the monetary authority anticipating that its
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policy affects agents’ expectations. Past movements in the output gap continue to affect
current inflation with the effect of an improved short run trade-off in achieving the policy
objectives.
3.4 Welfare Properties
As to reflect on the gains of commitment, the equilibrium under discretionary policy shall
be considered first. The corresponding interest rate rule can be obtained by substituting
the equilibrium process (3.14) and expectations (3.15) into the IS curve. Solving for it
gives
it = ψ0 + ψ1ut + ψ2rt (3.21)
with parameters
ψ0 = a¯pi, ψ1 =
(1− ρ)κ+ αρσ
σ[α(1− βρ) + κ2] , ψ2 =
1
σ
.
Evans and Honkapohja (2003) refer to relation (3.21) as the fundamentals-based form
of the optimal policy rule under discretionary policy since it depends only on current
exogenous shocks. However, as Woodford (2003b) notes, there exist many equivalent
ways of expressing optimal policy rules under the assumption of RE. In particular, the
fundamentals-based interest rate rule can be rewritten, using Etpit+1 = a¯+ c¯ρut, in order
to stress the role of expected inflation. This gives the optimal nominal interest rate
rule
it = γ0 + γpiEtpit+1 + γrrt (3.22)
where
γ0 = −(1− ρ)κ
ρλσ
ax, γpi = 1 +
κ(1− ρ)
αρσ
, γr =
1
σ
.
This formulation, as proposed by Clarida et al. (1999), affirms Taylor’s intuition that
the central bank should react with increasing the nominal interest rate more than one
for one in response to expected inflation moving above the target value. The policy
recommendation is easily justified by noting that an increased output gap would further
amplify inflationary pressure through the Phillips curve. To counteract this process, the
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real interest rate has to be increased so that households are induced to decrease current
consumption.
The fundamentals-based interest rate rule (3.21), on the other hand, highlights the
response to current cost push shocks. A positive deviation of current inflation can only be
counteracted by driving current output below its target. Note that this implies a trade-
off, being inherent to counteracting cost push shocks, which will be addressed below.
Clearly, by considering the functional form of expected inflation, the disparity between
(3.21) and (3.22) collapses under RE. However, if one departs from this assumption, the
rules are distinct and their properties differ as will be shown in chapter 5. In contrast
to cost push shocks, there is no trade-off inherent to counteracting demand shocks.
Irrespective of the representation, an optimally chosen interest rate rule will be designed
such that demand shocks rt are perfectly offset.
To obtain the fundamentals based interest rate rule, implementing the REE under com-
mitment, the equilibrium process (3.17) and the implied RE (3.18) can be substituted
into the IS curve. Solving for it gives
it = ψ0 + ψ1xt−1 + ψ2ut + ψ3rt (3.23)
with coefficients
ψ0 =
a˜xb˜x
σ
+ a˜pi + b¯pia˜x, ψ1 = b¯x
(
b˜x − 1
σ
+ b˜pi
)
, ψ2 = cx
(
b˜x + ρ− 1
σ
+ b˜pi
)
+ c˜piρ, ψ3 =
1
σ
.
(3.24)
As in the discretionary case, there are many equivalent representations of this interest
rate rule. Consider again a form which highlights the role of expected inflation. Using
the expression for Epit+1 in (3.18), the interest rate rule (3.23) can be rewritten as
it = γ0 + γpiEtpit+1 + γgrt,
where
γ0 =
a˜xb˜x
σ
, γpi = 1− κ
σα
, γr =
1
σ
.
This representation suggests two things: First, the optimal response to a demand shock
is independent of the policy regime. Like in an environment of discretion, optimal policy
under commitment perfectly offsets any shock to the output gap. The optimal response
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to a cost push shock, however, crucially differs from a policy of discretion. Due to the
efficient manipulation of beliefs, current output has to be reduced to a lesser extent
than under discretion since a credible threat of further reducing the output gap has the
immediate effect of reducing inflation through the ”expectations channel” in the Phillips
curve.
By analysing the unconditional standard deviations of inflation and the output gap,
and their response to the policy parameter α, the welfare properties of different policy
regimes and the trade-off implied by the model can nicely be illustrated, as pointed
out by Clarida et al. (1999). The MSV solution of the REE under discretion (3.14)
implies
σdx =
κ
α(1− βρ) + κ2σu, σdpi =
α
α(1− βρ) + κ2σu, (3.25)
where σu denotes the standard deviation of the cost shock ut and σdpi and σdx denote the
standard deviations of inflation and output under discretionary policy. Partial deriva-
tives with respect to the ”taste” parameter α unveil the ambivalent effect of a shift in
policy preferences:
∂σdx
∂α
= − κ(1− βρ)
[α(1− βρ) + κ2]2σ
2
u < 0,
∂σdpi
∂α
=
κ2
[α(1− βρ) + κ2]2σ
2
u > 0.
The more attention is paid to output stabilisation, i.e. as α is increasing, the lower
output volatility becomes in equilibrium. Lower output volatility, on the other hand,
can only be achieved at the cost of increasing inflation volatility. Due to this trade-off
there is in general (α > 0) gradual convergence towards the inflation target
lim
i→∞
Etpit+i = lim
i→∞
(a¯pi + c¯piρ
iut) = a¯ > pi.
However, the actual target pi is not reached for any αx > 0. A result which is known
as the inflationary bias under discretionary policy (see e.g. Clarida et al., 1999). This
stands in stark contrast to a policy under commitment where the first order conditions
were shown to be independent of the output target. As a consequence, the inflation
target is asymptotically approached
lim
i→∞
Etpit+i = lim
i→∞
(a˜pi + c˜piρ
iut) = pi.
Furthermore, the MSV solution (3.17) implies that the unconditional standard deviations
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of the output gap and inflation, denoted by σcx and σcpi respectively, are given by
σcx =
κ
α (1− βρ) + αβ (1− bx) + κ2σu, σcpi =
α
α (1− βρ) + αβ (1− bx) + κ2σu.
(3.26)
By comparing (3.26) to equilibrium deviations of the target variables under discretion
(3.25) it immediately follows that the economy can be stabilised to a higher degree if
the central bank is able to credibly commit to a rule.
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Chapter 4
Learning and Rational
Expectations
The REH presupposes a great deal of knowledge on the part of economic agents. Consid-
ering its complexity, this applies particularly strong to the New Keynesian model. The
derivation of aggregate dynamics not only relied on both optimal price setting of firms
as well as optimal consumption decisions by households, but also on the assumption that
these considerations are mutually available to all agents. Thus, rationality is not merely
a property of the individual, but of the economic model.
In fact, the REH constitutes a solution concept, rather than a behavioural notion. Yet,
the hypothesis does not provide sufficient grounds with this respect. Arrow (1986)
notes that the powerful implications of the REH derive from the conjunction with other
basic concepts of neoclassical theory, like equilibrium, competition or completeness of
markets. Arrow reckons that in some parts of the literature it seems to be asserted that
economic theory must be based on rationality, as a matter of principle. However, most
macroeconomic theories rely at least partly on concepts other than that of rationality.
The price rigidities in the New Keynesian model constitute a prominent example with
this respect. Friedman’s loose arguments on ”shoe leather” which substitute for a true
derivation of the demand for money, is another.
Arrow (1986) points out that economic theory defines rationality in terms of the choices it
produces. In light of computational restrictions, however, it appears disproportionate to
claim an optimal outcome. Theoretical work presupposes that agents know all parameter
values in order to solve their optimisation problem. In applied work, these parameter
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values have to be estimated before the model can be tested. Arrow therefore suggests
to redefine rationality in terms of the processes it employs, rather than the choices it
produces. With this definition in hands, rationality, or more specifically, its intersections
with neoclassical theory, do not have to be abandoned, but are rather supplemented by
a behavioural approach.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) take up on this point. They argue that it seems to be
more natural to assume the same limitations in knowledge and computation capacity
on the part of agents, as economists are facing in everyday work and propose adaptive
learning as a minimal deviation from the concept of rationality: Agents are assumed to
form expectations on grounds of econometric models whose parameters are updated as
new data becomes available.
On the one hand, adaptive learning can be considered as a plausible alternative to the
REH. While agents are not assumed to have optimal expectations ex ante, they are
assumed to employ an optimal technique in order to form expectations. Thus, they are
rational in a procedural sense. Given their limited information set, containing a history
of data points, they form expectations such that forecasting errors are orthogonal to
their model. On the other hand, adaptive learning provides a powerful backup for the
REH. This becomes apparent on grounds of the following observation. Even if all the
structural assumptions needed for the derivation of a REE are made, Arrow (1986) lines
out that one critical question remains: How can equilibrium be reached? The attainment
of equilibrium is in need of some disequilibrium process. But what should be regarded as
rational in the presence of disequilibrium? Adaptive learning can in some cases provide a
justification for the REH. The continuous updating of expectations may asymptotically
lead expectations to be rational. Thus, even if not coincidence of an objective and a
subjective world is presupposed, expectations can turn out to be self-fulfilling.
This chapter starts with an introduction to the idea of adaptive learning. Thereafter,
its intersections with, and applications to RE will be discussed. In course of this dis-
cussion the concepts of determinacy and E-stability will be introduced. The chapter
concludes with a justification for applying the presented concepts to the reduced-form
New Keynesian model.
44
4.1 Adaptive Learning
Upon implementation of some interest rate rule, the New Keynesian model can in general
be represented by
yt = A+BEtyt+1 + Cyt−1 +Dwt,
wt = Fwt−1 + t
(4.1)
where yt = (xt, pit)
′ denotes the vector of endogenous variables and wt = (rt, ut)′ is
assumed to follow a stationary VAR, so that t is white noise and both eigenvalues of F
lie inside the unit circle. To close the model, assumptions on the expectation formation
mechanism, i.e. on the definition of Etyt+1, are needed. The approach followed in this
thesis is to model bounded rationality by assuming that agents’ expectations are based
on econometric models, i.e. expectations are assumed to follow some linear function
whose parameters are updated each period by using Least Squares estimation.
Upon departure from rationality, care must be taken in distinguishing subjective from
objective descriptions of the economy. Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), agents’
(homogeneous) belief of the world will be referred to as the Perceived Law of Motion
(PLM) while the dynamics implied by their behaviour will be referred to as the Actual
Law of Motion (ALM). A priori, no coincidence of these dynamics will be assumed.
However, in order to enable asymptotic convergence of perceived and actual dynamics,
it will be assumed that agents condition their forecasts on the correct information set in
the following sense: Given that system (4.1) has a unique dynamically stable solution
under the assumption of RE, this solution will be a linear combination of {1, yt−1, wt}.1
While the exact nature of the solution is not common knowledge, agents are assumed
to understand the structure of the economy qualitatively such that their PLM takes the
form
yt = a+ byt−1 + cwt. (4.2)
The coefficient matrices a, b and c, having dimension 2× 1, 2× 2 and 2× 2 respectively,
1The assumption that agents are basing their expectations on the correct information set is hy-
pothesised for convenience and as to check for the robustness of some REE. In light of computational
restrictions, however, it appears plausible that agents belief formation is based on an information set,
whose dimensionality is strictly less than the dimensionality of actual dynamics in a REE. However, if
beliefs are not retracing the structure of the MSV solution, the REE can be attained by no learning rule
whatsoever. Chapter 6 discusses the Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium as a consistent alternative to
the REE, for the case when the PLM does not admit convergence to the latter.
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are estimated in period T by running Least Squares on the set {yt, 1, yt−1, wt}T−1t=0 . This
formulation is following the convention to not consider current variables for updating
coefficient estimates in order to avoid a simultaneity complication in the learning dy-
namics.
A crucial issue under adaptive learning is the so-called ”dating of expectations”. De-
pending on how the sequence of events is formulated, the information set being available
to agents at the time expectations are formed differs. While current exogenous variables
are mostly treated as observable, assumptions on the availability of current endogenous
variables are not consistent. Bullard and Mitra (2002) considered various Taylor-type
rules under the assumption that current endogenous variables are available so that fore-
casts are formed according to
Etyt+1 = a+ byt + cFwt,
where F is assumed to be known. Since the structural equations of the New Keynesian
framework imply that endogenous variables and expectations of next period’s variables
are simultaneously determined, this formulation might seem plausible. However, as
McCallum (2008) points out, the specification of information sets, being available for
expectation formation in period t, is a completely different matter from the specification
of what period’s expectations influence the determination of current variables.2 Evans
and Honkapohja (2006) analysed optimal monetary policy under commitment under the
assumption that current endogenous variables are not available for expectation forma-
tion. This leads to the forecasting rule
Etyt+1 = a+ b(a+ byt−1 + cwt) + cFwt.
Chapter 5 will outline that assumptions with respect to the available information set,
crucially affect the stability properties of REE under learning when the reduced form
system exhibits persistence. Under discretionary optimal policy, however, as analysed by
Evans and Honkapohja (2003), the relevant information set for the MSV solution does
not contain endogenous variables of the model. Expectational stability of this solution
is therefore independent of whether the information set includes yt or not.
2To underline the lack of any necessary connection between these assumption, consider a model which
both includes Et−1yt as well as Etyt+1. What should be regarded as the appropriate information set for
learning? While the prior expectations operator suggests that yt should not be available for learning,
the second operator indicates the contrary.
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This work will treat time-t endogenous variables as not being available on the follow-
ing grounds. As mentioned before, under adaptive learning a simultaneity complication
would occur if current endogenous variables were available for estimating the coefficients
in the linear model. For consistency then, it seems more natural to not include those
variables in the information set available for forming expectations. Furthermore, Mc-
Callum (1981) points out that data on contemporaneous economic measures is hardly
available for policy makers. It seems appropriate to presume the same limitations in
knowledge on part of the households. The sequence of events is therefore assumed as
follows: Upon determination of time t parameter estimates (at, bt, ct), the vector of ex-
ogenous shocks wt realises. Agents then apply their model to current data and form
conditional expectations according to
Etyt+1 = at + bt(at + btyt−1 + ctwt) + ctFwt. (4.3)
Note that this formulation presumes knowledge on the stochastic process {wt} in order
to predict wt+1. Equivalently, subjective belief formation could be modelled by explicitly
treating the persistence parameter matrix F as an estimate. Although this formulation
has some appeal due to its consistency, the main conclusions would not be altered (see
e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2008). For convenience then, the literature is followed by
treating exogenous shock processes as known.
The implied temporary equilibrium can be obtained by inserting subjective expectations
(4.3) into the reduced-form system (4.1). This shows that the ALM in period t is
following
yt = A+B (at + bt(at + btyt−1 + cwt) + ctFwt) + Cyt−1 +Dwt.
This relation implicitly defines a mapping from the PLM to the ALM. Let this mapping
be denoted by T : Θ → Rm where Θ ⊂ Rn is the set of parameter estimates with n
corresponding to the dimensionality of the information set, the PLM is based on and
where Rm is the set of implied dynamics. Thus, an element of Θ is the matrix θ = (a, b, c)
and the corresponding T-map is given by
T (a, b, c) =
(
A+B(I + b)a,Bb2 + C,B(bc+ cF ) +D
)
. (4.4)
In terms of this mapping, the temporary equilibrium in period t can be rewritten com-
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pactly as
yt = T (θt)zt, (4.5)
where zt = (1, yt−1, wt)′. From this formulation it becomes apparent that each observa-
tion of the economy is generated by a different model, or more precisely, by a model with
time varying parameters. Since this fact is not captured by the PLM (6.8), agents are
basing their parameter estimates on a misspecified model which implies that one central
assumption needed for consistency of the Least-Squares estimate is violated. However,
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) argue that expectations formed in this manner might
still be regarded as reasonable, if not fully rational, on the following grounds. First,
Bray and Savin (1986) show that in many cases the temporary misspecification during
transition to the REE would not be detectable by good econometric practise. Further-
more, asymptotically, the misspecification becomes vanishingly small if the REE is in
fact learnable.
4.2 Determinacy
The previous section introduced adaptive learning under the assumption that agents
correctly understand the structure of the economy. However, if the structure of the
economy gives rise to an infinity of solutions, agents may not be able to coordinate
on a particular one. Indeterminacy, i.e. local non-uniqueness of equilibrium, is widely
considered a non-desirable feature of economic models.34 If an infinity of solutions satisfy
the structural equations, implying that the objective distribution of the model is not
determined, the definition of RE is evidently meaningless. Moreover, if the equilibrium
path is not saddle point stable there is potential for non-fundamental variables, i.e.
variables having no inherent effect on the economy, to matter, only because agents
believe that they do.5 Woodford (2003a) reckons that one does not have to be certain
3McCallum (2003) notes that the term ”indeterminacy” became first prominent due to Patinkin
(1949), writing about an alleged logical inconsistency in classical monetary theory. Since households,
firms as well as the central bank were assumed to only care about real variables, the price level did not
appear in these models and was consequently not determined. This type of indeterminacy, to which
McCallum refers to as ”nominal-indeterminacy” is very different in character from the multiplicity of
stable solutions which are considered here.
4Gandolfo (1971) reckons that this feature has also been exploited to explain macroeconomic phe-
nomena by means of sunspots, self-fulfilling prophecies and animal spirits.
5Singular points in dynamic systems are said to be saddle point stable, if there exists exactly one
way to choose initial conditions such that the resulting dynamics are asymptotically stationary. Apart
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that an indeterminate economy will settle in such a bad equilibrium to nonetheless prefer
rules which give people a clear reason to not have such expectations, i.e. to prevent
indeterminacy through a suitably designed policy.
Furthermore, non-uniqueness also poses a challenge to the adaptive learning approach.
Which equilibrium point should serve as a grounds for the PLM? Honkapohja and Mitra
(2004) investigate ”non-fundamental” solutions (non-MSV solutions) in the New Key-
nesian model and show that these are also attainable under adaptive learning. The next
chapter will discuss the link between E-stability and determinacy in detail. For the
moment it suffices to emphasise that determinacy is a desirable property, also from the
perspective of adaptive learning.
The Blanchard and Kahn (1980) technique to analyse determinacy shall now be in-
troduced for the New Keynesian model which is represented by system (4.1). If the
economic system exhibits persistence, i.e. C 6= 0, this system can be rewritten in first
order form. Let therefore the (i, j)th entry of any matrix G be denoted by gij and note
that under all interest rate specifications considered so far, the second column of C in
(4.1) was zero. By defining xLt ≡ xt−1 and assuming that c11 6= 0, system (4.1) can be
rewritten asxtpit
xLt
 =
1 0 −c110 1 −c21
1 0 0

−1b11 b12 0b21 b22 0
0 0 1

Etxt+1Etpit+1
xLt+1
+ other, (4.6)
where other summarises terms being irrelevant for the present analysis. Note that REH
requires that there are no systematic forecasting errors, implying that Etzt+1 = zt+1 +
t+1 with Ett+1 = 0 for any variable z. Furthermore, forecast errors are supposed to
be uncorrelated over time so that E[tt+i] = 0 for all i 6= 0. Thus, system (4.6) can be
rewritten as a first order difference equation with a stochastic mean zero driving process.
These systems can easily be solved.
A fundamental notion for investigating determinacy of RE models is the distinction be-
tween predetermined and jump variables. The following definition is provided by Buiter
(1982, pp. 6): ”Xt is predetermined if and only if Xt is not a function of expectations,
formed at t, of future endogenous and/or exogenous variables. Pt is non predetermined if
and only if Pt is a function of expectations, formed at t, of future endogenous and/or ex-
from Rational Expectations models, optimal control problems also ”endowed” with the right amount of
freedom, to study this ”conditional stability” (see e.g. Gandolfo, 1971).
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ogenous variables.”6 Less formally this can be summarised by noting that predetermined
variables are fixed throughout a period, while jump variables are determined within a
period.
To find unique trajectories of a first order 3 × 3 system of difference equations, three
boundary conditions are needed in order to determine the arbitrary coefficients of the
homogeneous solution. In the case of predetermined variables, these usually take the
form of initial conditions. Jump variables, however, are characterised by the very absence
of ”historically” given values. Requiring the homogeneous part of the difference system
converge to zero as t → ∞, i.e. that the solution be dynamically stable, constitutes a
typical remedy for imposing constraints on these variables.
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) showed that Rational Expectations models in first order
form, like system (4.6), are uniquely determined if and only if the number of unstable
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, given in this case by
J =
1 0 −c110 1 −c21
1 0 0

−1b11 b12 0b21 b22 0
0 0 1
 , (4.7)
coincide with the number of predetermined variables.7 Given that all other eigenvalues
are located inside the unit circle, the initial conditions of non-predetermined variables are
uniquely determined by the requirement that the system be dynamically stable.
If, on the other hand, the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle exceeds the
number of predetermined variables, there exist infinitely many initial conditions, jump
variables can move to, without generating explosive dynamics. Since the notion of
”agents’ expectation” does not have a precise meaning when there is ”too much” stability,
determinacy is considered a necessary condition for the consistency of REE.
The matrix J , given by (4.7), will serve as a grounds for evaluating determinacy un-
der various interest rate specifications in chapter 5. From the derivation of the New
Keynesian model it is evident that both output and inflation are jump variables. Given
6The use of variables in this definition implicitly discloses that jump variables, in a wide sense, have
the dimension of prices.
7The notion of unstable eigenvalues is a little misleading in this context. Note that system (4.6)
is forward looking for which reason ”unstable eigenvalues” of J , i.e. eigenvalues, strictly lying outside
the unit circle, will lead to ”unconditionally” (independent of initial conditions) stable dynamics. This
can be seen by noting that their reciprocal, relevant for the recursively formulated difference system, is
strictly inside the unit circle.
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appropriate expectations, these variables can instantaneously take on any possible value.
The lagged output gap xLt , on the other hand, constitutes a predetermined variable in
period t. Thus monetary policy will be considered desirable if exactly two eigenvalues
of J lie inside the unit circle.
If the interest rate specification implies that current values of output and inflation are
independent of its lagged values, i.e. all elements of C are zero, determinacy can be
directly evaluated on the grounds of matrix B. If both eigenvalues of B lie inside the
unit circle there exists a unique way to iterate (4.1) forward, i.e. to obtain a unique
bounded RE solution.
4.3 E-Stability
Bullard (2006) notes that several key papers in the 1980’s explored adaptive learning
as a resolution for the following problem: How should agents come to possess RE if
they initially do not possess of detailed information on the economic situation they
find themselves in? As has been repeatedly argued (see e.g. McCallum, 2008), agents
must ultimately learn about the nature of the economy from data which is generated by
the economy itself. This section will introduce the ”E-stability principle”, thoroughly
discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), as a general tool for analysing whether some
REE can be attained under adaptive learning. In other words, whether adaptive learning
serves as a justification for the REE of interest.
Learnability of a REE is investigated under the assumption that agents know the ”qual-
itative” structure of the economy, implying that forecasts are based on the correct infor-
mation set. Furthermore, it is assumed that agents collect an ever increasing amount of
information while the structure of the economy remains unchanged. These assumptions
are clearly biased towards finding the RE process. In addition, the theorems used to
analyse convergence under adaptive learning are local in nature. Bullard (2006) therefore
reckons that this setup in fact represent a ”minimal deviation from Rational Expecta-
tions” and McCallum (2008) argues that if a proposed REE is not learnable in this setup,
it appears implausible that it could prevail in practise. Thus, Least-Squares learnability
is regarded a compelling necessary condition for a REE to be considered plausible.
Besides providing a behavioural justification for some REE, adaptive learning can also
be used as a selection criterion. In general, the dependence of current variables on
future conditions implies the possibility of a multiplicity of REE, as was discussed in the
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preceding section. While indeterminacy is mostly considered as an undesirable feature of
the economy, some authors disregard indeterminacy as a theoretical curiosity which only
poses the challenge to the theorist to select the correct equilibrium (see e.g. McCallum,
2003). Evans and Honkapohja (2001) adopt the perspective that one should focus on
those solutions which are robust to small forecast errors made by agents initially, i.e. on
equilibria which are stable under learning. Thus, they argue that indeterminacy should
not be considered a problem if all solutions except one turn out to be unstable under
learning.
This section will concentrate on learnability of the MSV solution of system (4.1). It is
evident that the relevant determinants of yt include a constant, yt−1 and wt. Therefore,
the MSV solution to this system takes the form
yt = a¯+ b¯yt−1 + c¯wt, (4.8)
where (a¯, b¯, c¯) are currently undetermined coefficient matrices. Rational Expectations
are given by
Etyt+1 = a¯+ b¯yt + c¯Fwt.
Inserting these relations into (4.1) shows that the coefficients in (4.8) and therewith the
MSV solutions of a REE must satisfy
(I−Bb¯−B)a¯ = A, (4.9a)
Bb¯2 − b¯+ C = 0, (4.9b)
(I−Bb¯−BF )c¯ = D. (4.9c)
Note that even when attention is restricted to stationary solutions, the matrix quadratic
(4.9b) can in general have multiple solutions lying inside the unit circle. This implies that
the REE is indeterminate and gives rise to the existence of sunspot solutions. However,
McCallum (2003) emphasises that the MSV solution is in fact unique if the additional
provision is satisfied that the solution is valid for all admissible parameter values. For
the case of (4.9b), the ”correct” MSV solution is the one whose value equals zero when
all elements of C equal zero. The relevant matrix b¯ will normally coincide with the one
whose eigenvalues are the smallest in modulus, as noted by McCallum (2003).
To analyse learnability of this MSV solution, reconsider the T-map (4.4) which was
introduced as a mapping from beliefs to outcomes. It is reproduced here for conve-
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nience
T (a, b, c) =
(
A+B(I + b)a,Bb2 + C,B(bc+ cF ) +D
)
.
Initially, Evans (1985, 1986) investigated a discrete version of the E-stability principle.8
He considered several iterations from the PLM to the ALM and imagined that parameter
estimates are updated after each iteration such that the specification of the PLM holds.
Letting θ(n) denote parameter estimates, where n indexes iterations, the T-map can be
used together with the definition of the PLM to obtain the dynamics
θ(n+ 1) = T (θ(n)).
If θ(n) → θ¯ over time, the analysed REE is said to be iteratively E-stable. Note that
this concept is ”eductive” in spirit since it investigates whether the coordination of
expectations on some REE can be attained by a mental process of reasoning. Evans
(1985) showed that in several controversial and prominent examples, the MSV solution
turns out to be iteratively E-stable. For the New Keynesian model, the discrete dynamics
of the parameter estimates can be seen to obey
a(n+ 1) =A+B[I + b(n)]a(n)
b(n+ 1) =Bb(n)2 + C
c(n+ 1) =B [b(n)c(n) + c(n)F ] +D.
(4.10)
Building upon prior work by Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans (1989) then turned
to a continuous representation of the above equations. Appendix A illustrates that
this continuous version is intimately related to an adaptive learning process which is
modelled as taking place in real time. Under various specifications of this process, the
asymptotic dynamics of the parameter estimates can be analysed with the E-stability
principle which advises to consider the differential equation
dθ
dτ
= T (θ)− θ,
where τ denotes notional time. Note that the parameters θ¯ satisfy θ¯ = T (θ) due to the
assumption that the PLM nests the RE solution.9 If the REE solution associated with
8The E-stability principle was first mentioned by Evans (1983).
9This nicely illustrates the self-fulfilling prophecy inherent to the concept of REE: the REE is a fixed
point in the mapping from beliefs to outcomes.
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the parameters θ¯ is locally asymptotically stable under this differential equation, then
the REE equilibrium is expectationally stable under Least Squares and other related
learning rules. Specifically, in the New Keynesian framework, this leads to the matrix
differential equations
da
dτ
= A+B(I + b)a− a,
db
dτ
= Bb2 + C − b,
dc
dτ
= Bbc+BcF +D − c,
(4.11)
which can be regarded as a conversion of equations (4.10) to a continuous form, ap-
propriate as the iteration interval approaches zero. Since the condition for the discrete
system (4.10) to be stable is that all roots of DT (θ¯) lie inside unit circle, while the con-
tinuous system (4.11) is stable given that DT (θ)−I < 0, iterative E-stability is evidently
a stricter condition than E-stability. In order to evaluate E-stability, system (4.11) has
to be linearised (since the second equation is non-linear) and vectorised. Evans and
Honkapohja show that these stability conditions can be stated in terms of the derivative
matrices
DTa(a¯, b¯) = B(I + b¯),
DTb(b¯) = b¯
′ ⊗B + I⊗Bb¯,
DTc(b¯, c¯) = F
′ ⊗B + I⊗Bb¯,
(4.12)
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Proposition 10.5. in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) implies local convergence of adaptive learning in the New Keynesian framework,
if and only if all eigenvalues of DTa − I, DTb − I and DTc − I have negative real parts.
Chapter 5 will analyse E-stability of different equilibria, being associated with different
interest rate rules, by means of derivative matrices similar to (4.11). Note however, that
the relevant matrices for analysing stability are mostly of lower dimension than seems
to be suggested by this expression. This results from the fact that the MSV solution is
in all examined cases, among other variables, a function of ut only and not of the entire
vector wt.
Before proceeding to the analysis of E-stability and determinacy under optimal monetary
policy, a justification for working with the reduced-form equations, as were derived under
the assumption of RE, shall be presented.
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4.4 A Justification for Reduced-Form Learning
Until recently, the learning literature has focused exclusively on whether, by using esti-
mated models, agents can learn to forecast optimally. The connection between forecast
and agent level decision making, however, has been neglected. Evans and McGough
(2006) note that the standard procedure, as applied to DSGE models, was ordinarily
as follows: (1) Rationality is assumed in deriving conditions that capture optimising
behaviour of agents, (2) relations are aggregated and market clearing is imposed, (3)
in order to obtain a reduced-form system of linear difference equations, the aggregate
relations are simplified and linearised. Only then, bounded rationality is imposed by
exchanging the RE operator by some other operator, capturing the boundedly rational
behaviour. This approach, referred to as ”reduced-form learning” by Evans and Mc-
Gough (2006), may well be criticised for it is not precise about the ”actions” taken given
some expectation and whether these are consistent with equilibrium.
This section follows Branch et al. (2010) in contrasting different learning dynamics.
Preston (2006) will be retraced in outlining a critique to the Euler-equation learning
approach and Honkapohja et al. (2011) will be followed in justifying the analysis of
bounded rationality on grounds of the reduced-form equations of the New Keynesian
model.
The ad-hoc nature of reduced-form learning was first addressed by Honkapohja et al.
(2011) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006). In order to provide a behavioural foundation
for adaptive learning, they identify agents as 2-period planners. Agents take decisions
today, conditional on their expectation of tomorrow, as to equate marginal utility with
marginal loss. That is, the Euler-equation
Cit =E
iCit+1 − σ
(
it − Eipit+1
)
+ gt − Eitgt+1, (4.13)
is considered as the behavioural primitive. Note the peculiarity inherent to interpreting
(4.13) as a decision rule when agents are boundedly rational: Although Cit+1 will be
determined by individuals themselves, forecasts of this quantity are needed in order
to decide on the level of consumption today. However, Evans and Honkapohja (2006)
assume that EiCit+1 is based on forecasts of xt+1 and show that ”Euler-equation learning”
provides a justification for analysing the New Keynesian model by means of reduced-
form learning. That is, they show that the reduced-form equations of the New Keynesian
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model can be obtained by assuming that (4.13) depicts a behavioural rule.10
Since the REE analysis of the New Keynesian model suggests that once the true probability-
laws are known, only one period ahead expectations matter for aggregate dynamics, the
Euler-equation learning approach appears intuitive. However, Preston (2005) reckons
that after having departed from RE, agents can’t be assumed to make use of the in-
formation that other agents’ consumption decision satisfy an Euler-equation in deciding
what to do themselves.11 Preston’s crucial conclusion from analysing optimal decision
rules of boundedly rational agents is that agents have to make long-horizon forecasts.
Drawing on prior work by Marcet and Sargent (1989) he proposes ”infinite-horizon learn-
ing” as an alternative to Euler-equation learning.
In chapter 2, Preston’s approach in deriving the consumption rule for the New Key-
nesian model has been illustrated. The consumption rule (2.8) is rewritten here for
convenience
Cit = (1− β)ω¯it + Eit
∞∑
T=t
βT−t [(1− β)YT − βσ(iT − piT+1) + β(gT − gT+1)] . (4.14)
Behaviour, represented by this decision rule, is assumed to follow a linear combination
of infinitely many forecasts which results from the fact that infinite-horizon learning
makes elaborate use of the individual budget constraint.12 Preston (2005) claims that
conditioning decisions on an infinite horizon is irreducible if agents are indeed optimisers.
In particular, he asserts that Euler-equation learning is not arbitrarily close to being
optimal. This follows from the observation that the behavioural rule (4.13) does not take
account of initial wealth endowments whatsoever. Thus, Euler-equation learning will
lead to systematic under-consumption for households with ω¯it > 0 and over-consumption
for households with ω¯it < 0.
Even if initial wealth endowments are constrained to being zero, Euler-equation learning
10In order to establish equivalence, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) assume identical households, ho-
mogeneous forecasts, and most importantly knowledge on the relation Cit = Yt = xt + Y
n
t for all i and
t such that agents form forecasts EitC
i
t+1 = E
i
txt+1 + Y
n
t+1. In deriving the Phillips curve it is assumed
that agents realise that the deviation of optimal prices to aggregate prices, denoted by pˆi, is a linear
function of Eitpˆ
i, xt and E
i
tpit+1. Since pˆ
i = pˆ and there is a proportional relationship between pˆ and
inflation, firms will rewrite pˆi as a linear function of expected inflation and current output.
11Honkapohja (2003) responds to this critique that such knowledge is in fact not presupposed when
deriving aggregate relations by means of Euler-equation learning.
12Although the Euler-equation learning approach does not make use of the budget constraint at all,
Honkapohja (2003) notes that it is not necessarily inconsistent with it. If the economy converges to a
REE, the transversality condition must hold ex post also under Euler-equation learning.
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is not necessarily optimal. Iterating the optimal decision rule (4.14) one period ahead
and taking expectations at time t gives the households’ expected optimal choice for
period t+ 1 as
EitC
i
t+1 = E
i
t
∞∑
T=t+1
βT−t [(1− β)YT − βσ(iT − piT+1) + β(gT − gT+1)] . (4.15)
The individual Euler-equation constitutes an optimal decision rule if and only if EitC
i
t+1
in (4.13) coincides with the optimal forecast given above. Since this optimal decision
rule is a particular linear combination of forecasts of the state variables, there is in
general no reason for forecasts of Cit+1, constructed from past observations of aggregate
disturbances, to coincide with (4.15).
Preston (2005) concludes that such suboptimal behaviour is a manifestation of a general
point: Forecasting EitCt+1 from E
i
txt+1 is internally inconsistent with household opti-
misation. It represents a forecast of future consumption which differs from what the
household expects to be optimal, given its current forecast of future income, inflation
and interest rates. Thus, forecasts relying on aggregate measures represent a less sophis-
ticated approach to forecasting since they fail to make use of information that the agent
necessarily possesses.
However, Honkapohja et al. (2011) note that once the REE is approached, both learning
mechanisms lead to the same forecast. Moreover, they demonstrate that the Euler-
equation analysis is consistent with the infinite-horizon analysis in the New Keynesian
model. This justification shall be retraced here. Thus, it will be shown that the aggre-
gated reduced-form system
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(it − Etpit+1) + rnt ,
pit = κxt + βEtpit+1 + ut,
can be derived from Preston’s micro-founded model of boundedly rational agents. The
most central assumption with this respect is that the law of iterated expectations holds
at the individual level. That is for any variable z it holds that
EitE
i
t+sz = E
i
tz fors = 0, 1, . . . . (4.16)
This is a standard assumption for agents making forecasts from linear laws of motion
estimated by Recursive Least Squares, which will be assumed in the following. Assume
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that agents are basing their expectation on the same information set and are using the
same estimation procedure. Given that each agent i has identical parameter estimates it
follows that the forecast of each agent is the same, that is Eit = E for all i. Note that there
is no need for any single agent to make this inference when forming the forecast needed
for his decision making. Every agent i forms his forecast independently from the other
agents in the economy and uses this forecast in the optimal consumption rule (4.14). It
follows from (4.16) and the assumption of homogenous expectations that Cit = Ct for all
i.
In order to establish consistency of infinite horizon learning and Euler-equation learn-
ing in this particular context, assume that gt, gt+1, Y
n
t and Y
n
t+1 are known at time t.
Taking quasi-differences of the optimal consumption rule (4.14), advancing the relation
by one time period, taking expectations of both sides and applying the law of iterated
expectations yields
Cit = βE
i
tC
i
t+1 + (1− β)(xt + Y nt )− βσ(it − Eitpit+1) + β(gt − gt+1), (4.17)
where additionally, the definition of the output gap was used. In order to implement
this behavioural rule, agents must forecast their own consumption decision. Market
clearing and the representative agent assumption imply Cit = Yt for all t and i. With
this regard, Honkapohja et al. (2011) assume that agents observe the equality Cit = Yt
from historical data and are furthermore making use of the relation Yt = xt + Y
n
t as to
base their forecast on aggregate output.13 Thus, individual expectations on consumption
decisions are given by
EitC
i
t+1 = E
i
txt+1 + Y
n
t+1, (4.18)
Substituting this into (4.17) and making use of the relation rnt = gt − gt+1 + Y nt+1 − Y nt
gives the behavioural equation
Cit = βE
i
tx
i
t+1 + (1− β)xt + Y nt − βσ(it − Eitpit+1) + βrnt . (4.19)
Finally, from market clearing Cit = Yt = xt + Y
n
t and using E
i
txt+1 = Etxt+1 and
13This critical assumption has been subject to critique by Preston (2005) since he regards market
clearing conditions as belonging to the set of REE conditions that agents are attempting to learn.
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Eitpit+1 = Etpit+1 the aggregate Euler-equation
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(it − Etpit+1) + rnt ,
is obtained. The derivation of the Phillips curve, from Preston’s optimal pricing rule, is
analogous and omitted here.
The Euler-equation learning approach and the infinite-horizon learning approach, clearly,
depict two contrasting positions of how expectation formation, other than rational, can
be modelled. Euler-equation learning relies on the subjective optimality margin only one
period ahead. Under RE this behaviour is optimal since forecasts of tomorrow contain
all the relevant information needed to take optimal decisions, in the New Keynesian
framework, today. Out of equilibrium, however, the quality of this learning rule is less
clear. Infinite-horizon learning, on the other hand, incorporates the subjective budget
constraint into the decision process, implying that agents’ choice satisfies their subjective
Euler-equation not only one period ahead, but at all iterations. Branch et al. (2010)
point out that this can be interpreted as assuming that agents solve each period their
dynamic optimisation problem.
While the consistency of infinite-horizon learning with the micro-foundations certainly
has appeal, Branch et al. (2010) note on a number of drawbacks of this approach: First,
agents are required to make forecasts at all horizons. This stands in stark contrast to
applied econometricians who ordinarily face finite horizons problems. Second, agents are
assumed to be sophisticated enough as to solve their infinite-horizon dynamic program-
ming problem. And most crucially, third, agent’s behaviour is based on the assumption
that their beliefs are correct. In a model of adaptive learning, however, forecasts are
updated by some estimation procedure and agents should be assumed to recognise that
their beliefs will change over time. Branch et al. (2010) point out that it is no longer
obvious that agents’ optimal decision will be determined by the fully optimal solution to
their dynamic programming problem, given this current belief. While this critique also
applies to short horizons, the conclusions are more dramatic in the case of infinite-horizon
learning since this approach places considerable weight on distant forecasts.14
Although both approaches are consistent in the New Keynesian model, they are not
identical, and lead to different paths of learning dynamics. Preston (2005) investigates
variants of monetary policies that respond to one-step ahead forecasts of inflation and
14Branch et al. (2010) introduce ”finite-horizon learning” where decisions are based on N-step ahead
Euler-equations in order to generalise existing learning mechanisms.
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the output gap, similar to the investigation of forward looking Taylor-type rules as
considered by Bullard and Mitra (2002). While agents in Preston’s analysis are required
to forecast all future paths of nominal interest rates, these forecasts are not required in
Bullard and Mitra’s article. Forecasts of inflation are not relevant for individual Euler-
equations. Honkapohja et al. (2011) point out that the difference in these setups can also
be interpreted by means of central bank transparency. That is, Preston’s analysis can
be explained by the assumption that agents do not know the exact policy rule. Greater
central bank transparency, on the other hand, allows agents to infer on this information
in Bullard and Mitra (2002). Depending on whether this knowledge is assumed or not,
Preston concludes that learning dynamics can be different between the infinite-horizon
and the Euler-equation approach in the one case, while they are exactly the same in
the other. A recent paper by Bullard and Eusepi (2009) isolates conditions under which
the Euler equation and infinite horizon approaches to learning yield the same E-stability
conditions.
The appropriateness of the learning assumptions can supposedly be assessed only by
addressing the ultimately empirical question of the nature of individual behaviour outside
equilibrium. In a stable or transparent regime one might expect that agents are using
short term forecasts. If the economy is constantly changing, on the other hand, behaviour
might be better described by a sophisticated learning approach. This thesis will work
out the implications of adaptive learning under the assumption that agents are making
one period forecasts only.
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Chapter 5
Properties of Interest Rate
Rules
Earlier work has evaluated the desirability of interest rate rules almost exclusively, on
whether their implementation implies the existence of a unique dynamically stable REE.
Only then, agents’ expectation are considered to have a precise meaning. Recently, the
learnability criterion has been put forward as another necessary condition for the plau-
sibility of some REE (see e.g. McCallum, 2008).1 This criterion imposes the behavioural
requirement that some REE may be attainable, in an out-of-equilibrium process, after
the economy was perturbed.
The relevance of these concepts is subject to heavy debates in the literature. McCallum
(2003) advocates the view that indeterminacy is rather a problem with one’s under-
standing of the model and not a problem with the economy which is represented by the
model. He argues that any well formulated model should provide a unique prediction
and regards indeterminacy as only posing the challenge to distinguish the right predic-
tion from the others. In a series of papers, McCallum suggests to view the MSV solution
as the only relevant equilibrium prediction and to regard the other solutions as theoret-
ical curiosities. McCallum interprets results from the learning literature, showing that
there exist REE which are indeterminate but where the MSV solution is nonetheless
E-stable, as supporting his perspective and as emphasising the relevance of the MSV
1LS-learnability, that is asymptotic convergence to some REE under adaptive learning, under the
assumptions that 1. the PLM is correctly specified, 2. the structure of the economy remains unchanged
and 3. agents are estimating with an efficient technique is not considered a sufficient condition for the
plausibility of a REE for obvious reasons.
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solution.
An opposing stance is taken by Woodford (2003a) who reckons that multiple equilib-
ria genuinely represent alternative possible outcomes for the economy in question. On
grounds of earlier work (Woodford, 1990), illustrating that adaptive learning dynamics
do not necessarily converge to the MSV solution, but may as well converge to stationary
sunspot equilibria, Woodford strongly rejects McCallum’s view that adaptive learning
supports the validity of the MSV principle. Instead, he interprets results from the learn-
ing literature as confirming the main point of the determinacy analysis. He points out
that both E-stability and determinacy obtain, ”when outcomes are not overly sensitive to
expectations, in a way that allows a perturbation of expectations to change outcomes to
an extent that justifies the alternative expectations.”(Woodford, 2003a, pp. 1179).
This chapter will summarise results on determinacy and E-stability for various interest
rate rules. In course of sketching some results for Taylor-type rules, the link between
E-stability and determinacy will be clarified. Thereafter, optimal monetary policy is
evaluated in light of uniqueness and learnability.
5.1 Taylor-Type Rules
The seminal paper by Bullard and Mitra (2002) gave an early example that conditions for
determinacy and E-stability to obtain can indeed coincide. As a baseline specification,
Bullard and Mitra considered interest rate rules of the form
it = ϕpipit + ϕxxt, (5.1)
where ϕpi and ϕx are non-negative parameters which are not both equal to zero. Note
that this specification of monetary policy is a simple feedback rule of the type discussed
by Taylor (1993).2 Bullard and Mitra show that the equilibrium implemented by this
interest rate rule is determinate, given that
ϕpi +
1− β
κ
ϕx > 1. (5.2)
Clearly, this is a version of the Taylor principle, stressing that a desirable monetary
policy should react sufficiently strong in response to inflation movements. Bullard (2006)
2In fact, Taylor considered inflation rules of the form it = r+pit+ϕpi(pit−pi) +ϕxxt where pi denotes
the inflation target and r is the average real interest rate.
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provides the following justification for this result: The Phillips curve implies that a
permanent increase in inflation goes along with an increased output gap of (1 − β)/κ
percentage points. In light of the interest rate specification (5.1), the left hand side
of (5.2) can be interpreted as the required adjustment of the nominal interest rate
in response to an increase in permanent inflation. Thus, the conclusion of analysing
determinacy for an arbitrary interest rate specification is similar to the result obtained
from analysing optimal monetary policy in chapter 3: The response of the interest rate
should be more than one-for-one to variations in expected inflation.
A key result of Bullard and Mitra (2002) is that the Taylor principle (5.2) is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the REE associated with the feedback rule (5.1) to be expec-
tationally stable. This seems to support Woodford’s view of a tight connection between
E-stability and determinacy. However, the authors also gave examples where these con-
ditions did not coincide. They considered forward-looking versions of the Taylor rule,
taking the form
it = ϕpiEtpit+1 + ϕxEtxt+1, (5.3)
where expectations of the monetary authority can be interpreted as being based on Least
Squares estimations. Bernanke and Woodford (1997) discussed policy rules of this form,
known as inflation forecast targeting, as a means to overcome the problems associated
with the long lag between change in policy and change in the inflation rate.3
Bullard and Mitra (2002) illustrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions for
uniqueness of equilibrium are given by
ϕx < σ
−1(1 + β−1), κ(ϕpi − 1) + (1 + β)ϕx < 2σ−1(1 + β),
and
ϕpi +
(1− β)
κ
ϕx > 1. (5.4)
In contrast to other specifications of the Taylor rule, values assigned to ϕx are of primary
importance for determining uniqueness in this case. In particular, an aggressive response
to output movements leads to indeterminacy while specifications of the form ϕpi > 1 and
3Svensson (1999b) emphasised that inflation forecast targeting can be seen as an optimal intermediate-
targeting rule since it provides the central bank with a way to implement first order conditions for
an optimum, while outsiders are given the opportunity to verify that these first order conditions are
implemented.
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ϕx sufficiently small, leave the resulting equilibrium determinate.
It turns out that relation (5.4) proves to be necessary as well as sufficient for the MSV
solution to be stable under adaptive learning. Thus, determinacy implies E-stability of
the MSV solution in this case and Bullard (2006) reckons that it seems to be a good
advice, both from the point of view of uniqueness of equilibrium as well as from the
point of view of attainability of that equilibrium, that policymakers adopt the Taylor
principle in selecting a particular policy rule.
However, even if policy makers adopt this recommendation there is ample space for
believe driven fluctuations and the analysis by Bullard and Mitra (2002) leaves open
the question whether these solutions are stable under learning. Honkapohja and Mitra
(2004) close this gap by analysing the stability of non-fundamental solutions in the New
Keynesian model. They show that there exist E-stable sunspot solutions for plausible
parameter specifications under forward looking Taylor-type rules and interpret this result
as strengthening the worries of Bernanke and Woodford (1997).4
With this result, Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) contribute to the discussion on the rel-
evance of determinacy by shifting attention to the learnability criterion. While they do
not consider sunspot solutions as theoretical curiosities, Honkapohja and Mitra argue
that the mere existence of these solutions should neither circumvent the associated policy
measure. Instead, monetary policy should focus on the learnability criterion and be con-
cerned with designing policy rules such that non-fundamental (non-MSV) solutions are
unstable under learning while the fundamental solution is stable under learning.
The results summarised until so far indicate that there exists a close connection between
the concepts of determinacy and E-stability. In particular, determinacy turned out to be
a sufficient condition for E-stability in each case. This poses the question why one should
not neglect the learnability criterion and concentrate on determinacy instead? This view
is in fact strengthened by McCallum (2007) who demonstrates for a broad class of models
that determinacy indeed implies E-stability. However, the crucial assumption underlying
his analysis is that agents have information on contemporaneous endogenous variables
available in their learning process. Extending his analysis to learning specifications
where agents have information on lagged variables available only, McCallum (2008)
4Bernanke and Woodford (1997) argue against inflation targeting on grounds of two sets of reasons:
First, inflation forecast targeting provides broad scope for indeterminacy, implying the potential of
arbitrary volatility in the inflation process. Second, if monetary policy is successful, the signal-to-noise
ratio in the inflation forecast is likely to become small. In the limit of perfect stabilisation, this implies
that there is no incentive for the private sector to gather information since the inflation forecast becomes
uninformative in this case.
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concludes that the strong link between determinacy and E-stability does not pertain in
this environment.
While Bullard and Mitra (2002) analysed various Taylor-type rules under the baseline
specification that agents have contemporaneous data available in their learning process,
they also checked for robustness of their results by considering the case that agents have
only lagged data available. In particular, they considered an interest rate rule of the
form
rt = ϕxxt−1 + ϕpipit−1,
and restricted, for consistency, agents’ information set to variables as of time t − 1.
Analytical results for characterising E-stability could not be obtained under this spec-
ification. Nevertheless, computations showed that there exist determinate equilibria
which are not attainable under adaptive learning. Note that the ”lagged data” specifi-
cation differs from the aforementioned specifications since it induces persistence into the
reduced-form model. Consequently, assumptions on the information set being available
to form forecasts matter in this case, while they are irrelevant for the other specifica-
tions.
5.2 Optimal Policy Rules
This section follows Evans and Honkapohja (2003) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006)
in analysing determinacy and E-stability under optimal monetary policy. While the
discussion primarily serves to further clarify the link between these concepts, it will also
serve as to apply the techniques which were presented in chapter 4. It was sketched that
Preston’s New Keynesian model with boundedly rational agents can be represented by
the aggregate, reduced-form equations
xt = Ext+1 − σ(it − Etpit+1) + rt,
pit = κxt + βEtpit+1 + ut,
(5.5)
where the stochastic disturbances rt and ut are both following stationary AR(1) pro-
cesses and Et denotes aggregated, non-rational expectations. The derivation of this
dynamic system was enabled by the assumptions that subjective expectations of indi-
viduals obey the law of iterated expectations, that forecasts are homogenous and that
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agents possess knowledge of market clearing conditions. Given these assumptions, the
Euler-equation learning approach provides a behavioural foundation for obtaining the
above relations.
To close the model, the nominal interest rate it has to be specified. In chapter 3, it was
shown that the implementation of optimal monetary policy is consistent with various
interest rate specifications. In particular, expectations-based interest rate rules were
distinguished from fundamentals-based rules. To avoid redundancy, this chapter will
focus on two specifications: The fundamentals based optimal interest rate rule under
commitment
it = ψ0 + ψ1xt−1 + ψ2ut + ψ3rt (5.6)
with coefficients given in (3.24), and the expectations-based optimal interest rate rule
under discretion
it = δ0 + δ1Etpit+1 + δ2Etxt+1 + δ3rt + δ4ut, (5.7)
where the coefficients can be found in (3.11). Note that these rules are structurally
similar to Bullard and Mitra’s ”lagged data” specification and their forward-looking
Taylor rule. Upon substitution of these interest rate specifications into the structural
model (5.2), the New Keynesian model can be represented by
yt = A+BEtyt+1 + Cyt−1 +Dwt,
wt = Fwt−1 + t,
(5.8)
where yt = (xt, pit)
′, wt = (rt, ut)′, both eigenvalues of F lie inside the unit circle and t
is a white noise vector. The properties associated with the expectations-based interest
rate rules will be analysed by means of the techniques which were established in chapter
4 and in terms of the implied matrices A,B,C,D in (5.8).
Fundamentals-Based rule
The fundamentals-based rule under commitment provides an example in the New Key-
nesian framework that determinacy does not necessarily imply E-stability. Under the
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fundamentals-based rule (5.6), system (5.8) is characterised by
A =
(
−σψ0
−κσψ0
)
, B =
(
1 σ
κ β + κσ
)
, C =
(
−σψ1 0
−κσψ1 0
)
, D =
(
0 −σψ2
0 1− κσψ2
)
.
By retracing the steps outlined in section 4.2, the system is rewritten in first order form
to obtain the matrix
J =
 0 0 10 β κ
(σψ1)
−1 ψ−11 −(σψ1)−1
 ,
which governs determinacy. Numerical calculations by Evans and Honkapohja (2006)
show that exactly two eigenvalues of J lie outside the unit circle for α small, while for
larger values of α, only one root lies outside the unit circle. Thus, there exist parameter
calibrations such that optimal monetary policy under commitment can be implemented
by the fundamentals-based policy rule without implying indeterminacy.
However, application of the E-stability principle shows that the resulting equilibrium
leads to instability under learning for all structural parameter values. This can be seen
by considering the following linearised differential equation
DTa − I =
(
b˜x + σb˜pi σ
κ(b˜x + 1) + (β + κσ)b˜pi (β + κσ)− 1
)
.
Expectational stability requires that all eigenvalues of DTa − I are negative, which is
equivalent with requiring that tr(DTa − I) < 0 and det(DTa − I) > 0. However, the
determinant is given by
(β − 1)b˜x − σb˜pi − κσ,
which is negative for all parameter values.5 Since this necessary condition for stability
failed, the eigenvalues of DTb − I and DTc − I do not have to be evaluated.
As a partial intuition for this result, Evans and Honkapohja provide the following obser-
vation. Suppose that all coefficients in the PLM are held constant at their equilibrium
values. The T-map for the coefficient api, the constant in the perceived inflation process,
5This can be seen by noting that κ, σ are positive, 0 < β < 1 and b˜x, b˜pi are also positive.
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then becomes
T (api) = −κσψ0 +
[
κ(1 + b˜x) + (β + κσ)b˜pi
]
a˜x + (β + κσ)api.
In economic terms this relation can be explained by interpreting a positive deviation of
api from its equilibrium value a˜pi as an exogenous shock to inflation expectations. From
the Phillips curve it follows that this has the immediate effect of increasing current
inflation by β times the shock. Through its effect on the real interest rate, the shock
induces households to increase consumption by σ times the shock which in turn increases
current inflation indirectly by κσ times the shock, again through the Phillips curve.
Thus, if policy makers concentrate on fundamental shocks and are not concerned with
counteracting non-rational expectations, the above reasoning implies that a shock to
inflation expectations raises current inflation by (β+κσ) times the shock. Reconsidering
the iterative E-stability approach, the above relation implies api(n+1) = constant+(β+
κσ)api(n). Since (β + κσ) is typically greater than one, a positive deviation of api from
a˜pi will initiate explosive dynamics. However, this story only provides a partial intuition
since expectational instability holds for all possible parameter values and in particular
for (β + κσ) < 1.
Evans and Honkapohja emphasise that this result should be taken seriously by policy
makers. One should not assume automatically that some REE will be attained only
because it is locally unique. A similar result is obtained for the fundamentals-based
optimal policy rule (3.21) under discretionary policy by Evans and Honkapohja (2003).
In contrast to optimal policy under commitment, however, the equilibrium is also inde-
terminate in this case.
Expectations-Based Rule
To overcome the problems associated with the fundamentals based policy rule, Evans and
Honkapohja (2003, 2006) propose to base interest rate specifications on private sector
forecasts. Substitution of the expectations-based interest rate rule under discretionary
policy (3.10) into the structural equations (5.2) implies the following matrices of system
68
(5.8)
A =
(
−σδ0
−σδ0κ
)
, B =
(
0 −βκ(κ2 + α)−1
0 βα(κ2 + α)−1
)
, C =
(
0 0
0 0
)
, D =
(
0 −σδ4
0 1− σδ4κ
)
.
(5.9)
Since there is no persistence under discretionary policy, i.e. all elements of C are zero,
determinacy is governed by the matrix B. It can easily be verified that both eigenvalues
associated with this matrix are located inside the unit circle for which reason the resulting
REE is locally unique.6
To analyse E-stability of the MSV-solution, consider the independent linear subsystems
for a and c, with slope coefficients
DTa − I =
(
−1 −βκ(κ2 + α)−1
0 βα(κ2 + α)−1 − 1
)
= B − I
DTc − I =
(
−1 −βκ(κ2 + α)−1ρ
0 βα(κ2 + α)−1ρ− 1
)
= ρB − I.
E-stability obtains if the eigenvalues of both DTa − I and DTc − I are negative. Given
that the eigenvalues of B are inside the unit circle it immediately follows that the REE,
implemented by the expectations-based optimal interest rate rule, is stable under learn-
ing since ρ < 1. Evans and Honkapohja (2006) show that these desirable properties also
hold for the expectations-based rule under commitment.
An intuition for the increased stability can be obtained by reconsidering the definition
of the interest rate rule. A positive deviation of api from its equilibrium value and
the hereby implied increased inflation expectations are directly counteracted by the
monetary authority. The nominal interest rate is lowered more than one for one in order
to decrease the output gap by κβ/(α+κ2) times the shock. This in turn has the effect of
lowering current inflation from β (the direct effect) to αβ/(α+κ2), through the Phillips
curve.
Note that the condition for determinacy is again more stringent in this case. In fact, it
turns out that this relation is systematic. Bullard and Eusepi (2009) consider a general
New Keynesian model and show that if the policy rule includes expectations of variables
for the next period, then determinacy implies E-stability in the case of Euler-equation
6The eigenvalues are given by 0 < βα(κ2 + α)−1 < 1 and 0.
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learning. Under infinite-horizon learning, however, this connection breaks down.
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Chapter 6
Restricted Perceptions
Equilibria
The preceding chapter outlined the desireable properties of expectations-based interest
rate rules: Given that the economy is close to the REE, these interest rate specifications
endorse private sector forecasts, being based on econometric models, to become self-
fulfilling. Moreover, there exists a unique way of forming expectations if the central bank
conditions its reaction on private sector expectations, i.e. the REE associated with these
rules is determinate. However, a central prerequisite for learning this equilibrium process
is that the structure of the economy is understood qualitatively. In the preceding chapter
this assumption was made for convenience and in order to check for the robustness of
different equilibria.
This chapter will analyse the implications when the assumption of bounded rationality
is taken one step further. Professional forecasters limit the number of variables in their
statistical models due to degrees of freedom restrictions or due to computational costs.
In light of scarcity and costliness of information, Branch (2006) argues that underpa-
rameterisation is a reasonable approach to expectation formation. The concept of RE,
however, has to be abandoned if this assertion is to be incorporated into a formal the-
ory. Given that the PLM is of lower dimensionality than the implied dynamics, it is
impossible for agents’ beliefs to coincide with the actual distribution of the model.
This incapability of agents’ perception to reflect actual dynamics might at first appear
implausible; especially in light of the REH and the hereby intimately linked optimising
assumptions that are prevalent throughout economics. However, Branch (2006) proposes
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to reconsider the following assertions made by Muth: ”(1) Information is scarce, and
the economic system generally does not waste it. (2) The way expectations are formed
depends specifically on the structure of the relevant system describing the economy.
(3) A ”public prediction,” in the sense of Grunberg and Modigliani [14], will have no
substantial effect on the operation of the economic system (unless it is based on inside
information).”(Muth, 1961, pp. 316)1
Branch (2006) convincingly argues that adaptive learning in general, and in particu-
lar by means of underparameterised models, is consistent with these assertions, given
that agents’ forecasting model satisfies an orthogonality condition. He interprets a self-
referential economy as consisting of agents who only understand the economy so far as
their own subjective model. In order to be consistent with Muth’s hypothesis, these
models must reflect, in some dimension, the true dynamics of the economy. Branch ar-
gues that if agents’ beliefs within their forecasting model are not contradicted by actual
outcomes, then agents can not be freely disposing of useful information. Furthermore,
there is also correspondence between beliefs and outcomes under adaptive learning since
beliefs are supported by the structure of the economy. Branch concludes that Muth’s
hypothesis is satisfied whenever agents’ forecasting errors are uncorrelated with their
forecasting model. Then, the forecasting models are consistent with the economy in the
sense that agents can not tell that their model is distinct from the underlying stochastic
process.
The notion that agents’ beliefs come from misspecified forecasting models but agents
are unable to detect their misspecification was first used by Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) and defined as a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE). In the following, this
equilibrium notion is illustrated in the New Keynesian model under optimal discretionary
policy. The E-stability of one particular RPE will be discussed and conclusions for the
value of central banks’s transparency will be drawn. Thereafter, an extension to the
RPE, the so-called Misspecification Equilibrium (ME), will be presented.
6.1 Central Bank’s Transparency
Recently, Berardi and Duffy (2007) pointed out the importance of the RPE in light of
central banks’ transparency. High-quality monetary policy reports as well as an explicit
1[14] refers to: Grunberg, E. and F. Modigliani (1954): ”The Predictability of Social Events,” Journal
of Political Economy, 62:465-478
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announcement of policy objectives are widely considered essential for establishing and
maintaining credibility. Under adaptive learning, it may reasonably be argued that
such policy measures help to form a correctly specified PLM. This section is following
Berardi and Duffy (2007) in discussing the advantages and drawbacks of central banks’
transparency when agents are learning.
Inflation targeting is regarded as one of the most important and successful monetary
policy strategies in place (see e.g. Svensson, 2010). Around 25 industrialised and non-
industrialised countries have adopted this strategy, which is, inter alia, characterised by
a high degree of transparency and accountability.2 In view of traditional central banks’
behaviour, where policy objectives and policy decisions have been subject to considerable
secrecy, the claim for transparency is exceptional. However, the claim can be retraced
by drawing on contemporaneous monetary models. With the incorporation of micro-
foundations, aggregate movements have been explained by private sector forecasts and
central banking, consequently, became understood as a management of expectations.
Transparency, being intimately linked to credibility, clearly depicts a valuable measure
with this respect.
Under adaptive learning, the value of central bank’s transparency has been interpreted
in various ways. Orphanides and Williams (2005) concentrated on the increased infor-
mational supply transparency depicts. They show that agents, using a correctly specified
model but a truncated sample of data, find it easier to learn the REE if the central bank
announces its inflation target. Convergence to equilibrium is therefore faster. Berardi
and Duffy (2007), on the other hand, understand the value of central bank transparency
as not only providing better information in a quantitative sense, but as providing more
information qualitatively.
Specifically, they argue that central banks are in the position of providing the public
with the correct forecast. In the New Keynesian model, this forecast not only depends
on whether optimal policy is conducted under discretion or under commitment, but
moreover on the specific policy targets. As the central bank is assumed to hold this
information, it is in the position to inform the public about the relevant structure and
therewith, to provide the correct PLM.
2Svensson (2010) notes that inflation targeting is characterised by (1) an announced numerical infla-
tion target (usually around 2%) (2) an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an
inflation forecast (”inflation forecast targeting”) and (3) a high degree of transparency and accountability.
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Restricted Perceptions under Discretionary Policy
The preceding chapter indicated that, upon implementation of the expectations-based
interest rate rule under discretion, the economy can be represented by the system
yt = A+BEtyt+1 +Dwt
wt = Fwt−1 + t
(6.1)
where, as usual, yt = (xt, pit)
′, wt = (rt, ut)′ and the matrices A,B and D are given in
(5.9). In analysing the stability of the MSV solution (which takes the form yt = a+ cut)
it was implicitly assumed that agents anticipate nonzero target values x and pi. If the
central bank is not explicit about these targets, agents might as well consider solutions
of the form
yt = cut (6.2)
where yt = (xt, pit)
′ and c = (cx, cpi). With policy objectives x = pi = 0, all elements of
A are zero for which reason the MSV solution for the system (6.1) was given by (6.2).
Berardi and Duffy (2007) rationalise the assumption that agents omit the constant term
of the MSV solution on two grounds. First, if the private sector is unaware of the
existence of a central bank, it might choose to exclude constant components from its
model as the inclusion of these terms is only necessary because there is a monetary
policy. As a second, more compelling reason, they suggest that the private sector is
aware of the existence of the monetary authority, but falsely assumes that both x and pi
equal zero.
Under the assumption that private forecasts are based on (6.2) and therefore given by
Etyt+1 = cρut, the implied T-map takes the form
T
(
cx
cpi
)
=
((
(κpi + αx)(α+ κ2)−1
κ(κpi + αx)(α+ κ2)−1
)
,
(
−κ(βcˆpiρ− 1)(α+ κ2)−1
α(βcˆpiρ+ 1)(α+ κ
2)−1
))
. (6.3)
Clearly, the REE no longer depicts an attainable fixed point of this map. Since the esti-
mated PLM (6.2) can not possibly converge to the REE, Evans and Honkapohja (2003)
refer to models of this form as ”misspecified models”. It was pointed out that subjective
models are ”misspecified” in general since the PLM does not capture the fact that the
parameters of the ALM are time-varying. However, in contrast to misspecifications of
the form (6.2), the misspecification of a correctly specified PLM becomes vanishingly
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small if the economy convergence to the REE.
Nevertheless, Branch (2006) argues that forecasts based on the model (6.2) are consistent
with Muth’s assertions if the parameter vector c is formed as the optimal linear projection
of the state yt = T (c)(1, ut)
′ on the subjective model space ut. That is, the parameter c
must satisfy the Least-Squares orthogonality condition
Eut (yt − cˆut) = 0.
Then, in equilibrium, agent’s beliefs are consistent with the actual process in the sense
that their forecasting errors are undetectable within their perceived model. This condi-
tion implies that in a RPE, the parameter vector c has to obey
cˆ =
(
cˆx
cˆpi
)
=
(
κ(α+ κ2 − αβρ)−1
α(α+ κ2 − αβρ)−1
)
= c¯, (6.4)
where c¯ denotes the REE value of the vector c.3 Thus, agents correctly perceive the
one dimension of reality which they are adhering to. Furthermore, within their model,
they are predicting optimally. Consequently, it may well be argued that the RPE is fully
rational, given that agents are ignorant of their restricted perceptions. Combining the
T-map (6.3) with (6.4) gives the dynamics in a RPE to obey(
xt
pit
)
=
(
(κpi + αx)(α+ κ2)−1
κ(κpi + αx)(α+ κ2)−1
)
+
(
κ(α(1− βρ) + κ2)−1
α(α(1− βρ) + κ2)−1
)
ut. (6.5)
The next section investigates the question whether this equilibrium point is attainable
under adaptive learning.
E-stability of the Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium
When the PLM is underparameterised, the E-stability principle does not apply in gen-
eral. Instead, the associated ODE, governing the asymptotic dynamics of the system,
has to be derived explicitly since the misspecification can alter the stability condition
for the resulting equilibrium (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). Consider therefore the re-
cursive representation of the Least-Squares estimate for c. Appendix A shows that upon
the transformation Rt = St−1, with Rt being the second moment of ut, the Recursive
3For equilibrium values of the coefficients under RE see (3.16)
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Least Squares algorithm takes the form
ct =ct−1 + t−1S−1t−1ut−1
[
T (ct−1)(1, ut−1)′ − ct−1ut−1
]′
,
St =St−1 + t−1
t
t+ 1
(utut − St−1).
(6.6)
For establishing the associated ODE, the steps outlined in section A.3 are followed.
Consider the asymptotic mean
h(Φ) ≡ lim
t→∞E
(
S−1t−1ut−1 [T (ct−1)(1, ut−1)− ct−1ut−1]′
t
t+1(utut − St−1)
)
with Φ = (ct, St)
′ which governs the dynamics of the recursive algorithm, at an equi-
librium point (i.e. at a fixed point of (6.6)), as t → ∞. Taking expectations and limits
gives
dc
dτ
=S−1
σ2u
1− ρ2 (T2(c¯)− c¯)
dS
dτ
=
σ2u
1− ρ2 − S,
where T2 denotes the second column of the T-map (6.3). Since S converges globally
to σu/(1− ρ2) the asymptotic dynamics for the vector c are determined by the smaller
differential equation
h(c) =
dc
dτ
=
(
−κ(βc¯piρ− 1)/(α+ κ2)− c¯x
α(βc¯piρ− 1)/(α+ κ2)− c¯pi
)
.
Note that stability of the misspecified model is governed by the E-stability principle in
this case. The linearised ODE for the parameter c takes the already familiar form
d
dc
h(c¯) =
(
−1 −βκ(κ2 + α)−1ρ
0 βα(κ2 + α)−1ρ− 1
)
= DTc − I,
with associated eigenvalues −1 and βαρ/(κ2 + α) − 1. Since both of these eigenvalues
are strictly negative, the RPE (6.5) is stable under adaptive learning.
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The Value of Transparency
The preceding analysis illustrated that both the REE as well as the RPE are expecta-
tionally stable under the expectations-based interest rate rule. While the variance of
these equilibria is identical, their means differ. It turns out that the equilibria, indicated
by the superscript, satisfy the simple relation(
xREEt
piREEt
)
=
(
xRPEt
piRPEt
)
+
(
0 −βκ(κ2 + α)−1
0 βα(κ2 + α)−1
)(
a¯x
a¯pi
)
, (6.7)
where the REE vector a¯ is given in (3.16). Since a¯pi > 0, relation (6.7) implies that
xREEt < x
RPE
t while pi
REE
t > pi
RPE
t . However, the relative welfare properties of these
equilibria is not directly apparent from this relation. In order to assess the magnitude
of period loss, further restrictions in the analysis are needed.
The response to cost push shocks is equivalent in these equilibria since cˆ = c¯. For
analytical convenience then, it is assumed that ut = 0 for all t. Consider first the case
that the central bank’s target values for inflation and the output gap are given by pi = 0,
x > 0. Relation (6.7) implies in this case
xREEt =
α(1− β)
α(1− β) + κ2x <
α
α+ κ2
x = xRPEt < x,
piREEt =
ακ
α(1− β) + κ2x >
ακ
α+ κ2
x = piRPEt > 0.
This relation shows that inflation is persistently above its target value while the output
gap can not be increased efficiently. A result which is often referred to as the ”inflationary
bias problem” (see e.g. Clarida et al., 1999). From the above ordering it is immediate that
the REE yields unambiguously lower welfare than the RPE. In particular, by drawing
on the definition of the loss function (3.1), one obtains LREEt > L
RPE
t for any value of α.
Thus, the central bank could benefit from being intransparent about its non-zero target
value x.
However, non-zero inflation targets have been adopted by most central banks either
explicitly or implicitly, as Berardi and Duffy (2007) note.4 Given pi > 0 and x = 0,
4The Federal Reserve was a prominent example of an implicit inflation targeting bank until Fed’s
Chairman Ben Bernanke made the 2% inflation target explicit on January 25th, 2012.
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relation (6.7) implies
0 < xREEt =
κ(1− β)
α(1− β) + κ2pi <
κ
α+ κ2
pi = xRPEt ,
pi > piREEt =
κ2
α(1− β) + κ2pi >
κ2
α+ κ2
pi = piRPEt
and it follows from the definition of the loss function that LREEt < L
RPE
t for all values
of α. Thus, central banks, pursuing a policy which stabilises output around its natu-
ral level and inflation around pi > 0, profit from being transparent about their policy
objectives.
Berardi and Duffy (2007) use different calibrations in simulating the model numerically
for the case when ut is not constrained to being zero. Their main finding is that the
REE yields unambiguously higher welfare given that the inflation target is sufficiently
large and that the output target is sufficiently small. Specifically, if
pi > piREEt > pi
RPE
t ,
yRPEt > y
REE
t > y,
for all t, then the loss for the central bank under RE is always smaller, implying a
positive value of transparency.
If the central bank is acting under commitment, an announcement of the policy targets is
not sufficient for the attainment of RE. Instead, agents also have to be informed about the
relevance of lagged variables. Clearly, there exists an abundance of underparameterised
equilibria in this environment. This raises the question which equilibrium, or more
specifically, which underparameterised PLM should be thought of as the most plausible.
The next section will introduce the concept of a Misspecification Equilibrium as to deal
with this ambiguity.
However, for optimal monetary policy under commitment, Berardi and Duffy (2007)
show that, irrespective of the calibration and of the particular misspecification, the REE
always yields higher welfare. This result is intuitive since the gains from commitment are
grounded in an efficient management of expectations. If the private sector is boundedly
rational and running the risk of adopting a misspecified forecasting rule, the central bank
can enhance the management of expectations by being transparent.
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6.2 Extending Restricted Perceptions: Misspecifiation Equi-
libria
The idea of modelling agents’ expectations on grounds of underparameterised forecast-
ing models is appealing due to its apparent proximity to reality. From a theoretical
perspective, however, the concept is highly unattractive. The power of the REH can be
attributed to the universality of its applicability. Irrespective of the particular model,
there exists exactly one way of forming rational expectation (provided the model is de-
terminate). Restricted perceptions, on the other hand, are by definition non-unique and
hence arbitrary. Instead of having neglected the constant term in the MSV solution,
agents could as well have been assumed to neglect the dependence on ut in the example
above.
Branch and Evans (2006, 2007) resolve this weakness of the equilibrium concept by
endogenising the underparameterisation. They consider the set of all underparameterised
forecasting rules, for some model, and argue that an equilibrium concept most consistent
with Muth’s hypothesis will have agents only choose the best performing statistical
models from this set. The idea of a Misspecification Equilibrium (ME) shall be presented
in the afore discussed environment.
In the New Keynesian model under discretionary policy the set of all under parameterised
forecasting rules is given by the elements
PLM1 : yt = a,
PLM2 : yt = cut,
(6.8)
where a = (ax, api)
′ and c is defined equivalently. Restricted to using underparameterised
forecasts, agents can either choose to base their expectations on the shock ut, or they
can choose to form expectations on basis of the sample mean. Branch and McGough
(2009) derive a New Keynesian model under the assumption that agents’ expectations
are heterogenous. The reduced form equations of their model are equivalent to the
reduced form equations of this thesis. Letting n denote the fraction of agents using
PLM1, aggregate expectations in their model obey Ez = nE
1z + (1 − n)E2z, for any
state variable z.
Substituting in the diverse beliefs along with the expectations-based interest rate rule
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under discretion, the New Keynesian model can be written in the form
yt = A+B(an+ (1− n)cρut) +Dwt, (6.9)
where the matrices A,B,D can be found in (5.9). Although agents are assumed to base
their forecasts on misspecified models, they are required to forecast in a statistically
optimal manner. Thus, their models have to satisfy the orthogonality conditions
Eut(yt − cˆut) = 0,
E(yt − aˆ) = 0,
implying that the coefficient vectors aˆ and cˆ are, in equilibrium, constrained to
aˆx(n) =
(αx+ κpi)(1− nβ)
α(1− nβ) + κ2 , cˆx(n) = −
κ
α(1− βρ(1− n)) + κ2
aˆpi(n) =
κ(αx+ κpi)
α(1− nβ) + κ2 , cˆpi(n) =
α
α(1− βρ(1− n)) + κ2 .
(6.10)
Note the proximity of these coefficients to the corresponding coefficients in a REE. It
holds that cˆ(0) = c¯ and aˆ(1) = a¯, where the bar denotes REE values. Given a proportion
n of agents using forecasting model PLM1, it follows from combining (6.10) and (6.9)
that the RPE is uniquely determined by
yt(n) = aˆ(n) + cˆ(n)ut. (6.11)
The RPE analysed in the preceding section is a particular case of this set of RPEs,
corresponding to the case n = 0. This equilibrium was shown to be expectationally
stable. If, on the other hand, all agents are basing their prediction on PLM1, i.e. n = 1,
the unconditional mean of the RPE would coincide with the unconditional mean of the
corresponding REE. By retracing the steps outlined in the previous section, the linearised
differential equation, governing the asymptotic dynamics of the parameter vector a(n),
for the case n = 1, can be seen to obey
d
da
h(a¯) =
(
−1 −βκ/(α+ κ2)
0 αβ/(α+ κ2)− 1
)
.
Since both eigenvalues of this matrix are negative, it follows that the RPE (6.11) is stable
under adaptive learning for n = 1. Moreover, it immediately follows from (6.10) that
the unconditional standard deviation of y(1) is smaller than the corresponding standard
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deviation of the REE. Combining this insight with the fact that the unconditional mean
of these equilibria coincide, it follows that y(1) is associated with an unambiguously
smaller loss for each period.
However, instead of analysing various proposals for some RPE, the idea of a ME is
to determine the proportion n endogenously. This is achieved by assigning a fitness
measure to each available predictor. Following Branch and Evans (2011) it is assumed
that agents seek to minimise their forecast mean square error. Thus, forecasting model
PLMj , j = 1, 2, is ranked according to
EUj = −E(yt+1 − Ejyt+1)′(yt+1 − Ejyt+1), (6.12)
where Ej denotes forecasts based on model j. In the framework of the New Keynesian
model this metric seems appropriate since one period ahead forecasts are needed in the
structural equations. Furthermore, if agents were conditioning their forecasts on ”full”
information, the hereby implied rational expectations were assigned the maximal fitness
under this metric. Branch and Evans (2007) therefore argue that an ordering implied
by the mean square error preserves the structure of rational expectations when agents
are restricted to a limited information set.
The endogenous value n is assumed to depend on the relative forecast performance.
Following Brock and Hommes (1997) the map from predictor fitness to predictor choice
is a multinomial logit (MNL) map, taking the form
n =
exp(λEU1)
exp(λEU1) + exp(λEU2)
.
The parameter λ, called the ”intensity of choice”, determines the sensitivity of agents’
reaction to changes in the forecasting success. While Brock and Hommes (1997) con-
centrate on large but finite values of λ, Branch and Evans (2006) focus on the case
when λ → ∞. They argue that finite values of λ parameterise deviations from full
utility maximisation whereas agents are only selecting the best-performing predictor as
λ → ∞. Furthermore, the latter specification is analytically convenient. Branch and
Evans (2006) show that fixed points of the MNL map can be easily characterised for
infinite λ. Letting F : [0, 1] → R with F (n) = EU1 − EU2, the MNL can be rewritten
as
n =
1
2
(tanh(λF (n)) + 1) ≡ Tλ(n).
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On grounds of this map it is possible to give the following definition: A Misspecification
Equilibrium (ME) is a distribution of agents n∗ such that Tλ(n∗) = n∗. Note that
Tλ(n) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a continuous and well-defined function provided that an RPE
exists.
In a ME the parameters of the forecasting models, the distribution of agents using the
diverse forecasting models as well as the stochastic process for the state variables are
jointly determined. From the definition of Tλ it is evident that the number and the
nature of ME depend on the properties of F (n). Specifically, Branch and Evans (2011)
provide the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let N∗λ = {n∗|n∗ = Tλ(n∗)} denote the set of MEs. In the limit of large
λ, N∗ has one of the following properties:
1. If F (0) < 0 and F (1) < 0 then n∗ = 0 ∈ N∗ (Condition PLM2)
2. If F (0) > 0 and F (1) > 0 then n∗ = 1 ∈ N∗ (Condition PLM1)
3. If F (0) < 0 and F (1) > 0 then {0, nˆ, 1} ⊂ N∗, where nˆ ∈ (0, 1) (Condition ME)
4. If F (0) > 0 and F (1) < 0 then n∗ = nˆ ∈ N∗, where nˆ ∈ (0, 1) (Condition H)
In general, F is not necessarily monotonic for which reason there may exist more equilib-
ria than those stated in the above proposition. However, when condition PLM2 applies,
no agent has an incentive to base his forecast on another model when all agents are
using PLM2. Condition PLM1 is the analog in favour of PLM1. In contrast to these
conditions, there is potential for heterogenous use of forecasting models under condition
ME and condition H. Condition ME characterises a sufficient condition for the existence
of multiple equilibria. Both n∗ = 0 as well as n∗ = 1 are potential equilibria in this
case. Furthermore, there also exists an interior equilibrium nˆ. However, Branch and
Evans (2006) show that this equilibrium is not stable under adaptive learning when F
is monotonic since then T ′(F (nˆ) > 1 and any deviation of nˆ results in better forecasting
performance of either PLM1 or PLM2. When F is monotonic, condition H implies that
F (n) crosses zero from above. The ME with Intrinsic Heterogeneity is thus stable under
adaptive learning in this case (Branch and Evans, 2006).
In the New Keynesian framework under the expectations-based interest rate rule, the
function F is given by
F (n) = 〈aˆ(n), aˆ(n)〉 − 〈cˆ(n), cˆ(n)〉 ρ
2
1− ρ2σ
2
u,
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where 〈, 〉 denotes the inner product. From (6.10) it follows that
F (0) ≷ 0 iff (αx+ κpi)2Ω1 ≷
ρ2
1− ρ2σ
2
u,
F (1) ≷ 0 iff (αx+ κpi)2Ω2 ≷
ρ2
1− ρ2σ
2
u.
(6.13)
where
Ω1 =
(1 + κ2)[α(1− βρ) + κ2]2
(α+ κ2)2(α2 + κ2)
and Ω2 =
[(1− β)2 + κ2](α+ κ2)2
[α(1− β) + κ2]2(α2 + κ2) .
Each condition of proposition 1 can be satisfied for suitable choice of the structural
parameters. In particular, as σ2u → ∞, forecasts based on model PLM2 are more
accurate, implying that n∗ = 0. The same is true for the case when the central bank
has target values x = pi = 0. If, on the other hand, the stochastic process of the shock
comprises little information, i.e. σ2u → 0 or ρ → 0, forecasts based on the sample mean
are more efficient, implying that n∗ = 1.
To gain some intuition on how intrinsic heterogeneity may arise, consider the the case
when the central bank is following a strict inflation targeting policy (i.e. α = 0). In
this case, it holds that Ω1 > Ω2, implying that we have condition PLM1, PLM2 or H,
depending on the parameters of the model. Condition ME can not arise in this case.
The mean square forecast error associated with PLM2 can be seen to obey
−EU2 = pi[(1− nβ)
2 + κ2]
κ2
+ σ2u,
in this case. Thus, the accuracy of this model is decreasing in its relative usage. This
follows from the observation that the unconditional mean of the output gap, which agents
are neglecting under PLM2, is increasing in (1− n). Under PLM1, on the other hand,
expectations are constant and the MSE is given by
−EU1 = 1
1− ρ2σ
2
u.
This expression is more rapidly increasing in the variance σ2u, compared to −EU2 and
therefore continuously performing worse as σ2u →∞. However, note that the error asso-
ciated with PLM1 is independent of its relative usage since private sector expectations
only have an effect on the response to shocks. The long-run mean of inflation and the
output gap is not affected by expectations.
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Suppose first that all agents are basing their forecast on PLM1. Whether n = 1 depicts
a misspecification equilibrium depends on whether the zero-mass agent has an incentive
to deviate from the consensus forecast. Whenever
F (1) =
pi2[(1− β)2 + κ2]
κ2
− ρ
2
1− ρ2σ
2 < 0, (6.14)
PLM1 is suboptimal and adopting model PLM2 will result in more accurate predictions.
Thus, n = 1 is no equilibrium point and agents will start to make use of the alternative
model. However, as mentioned before, the absolute performance of PLM2 is decreasing
in its relative usage. Since F is monotonic, there exists an nˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
F (nˆ) =
pi2[(1− nˆβ)2 + κ2]
κ2
− ρ
2
1− ρ2σ
2 = 0.
This illustrates that intrinsic heterogeneity may arise under optimal discretionary policy.
Moreover, the ME associated with nˆ is unique, provided that
pi2(1 + κ2)
κ2
>
ρ2
1− ρ2σ
2
u >
pi2[(1− β)2 + κ2]
κ2
.
Note that these inequalities are satisfied for a typical calibration of the model, as pro-
posed by Woodford (2003b): σ = 1/0.157, κ = 0.024, β = 0.99. The exogenous dis-
turbance is, following Branch and Evans (2011), specified by ρ = .5, σ2u = .25 and
the inflation target is assumed to be pi = 0.02. The equilibrium proportion, relying on
forecasts based on PLM1, is then given by n
∗ ≈ 0.66.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
This thesis analysed adaptive learning from two perspectives: On the one hand, the con-
tinuous updating of expectations was presented as a plausible, procedurally rational way,
to justify the attainment of RE. With this regard, E-stability was presented as a neces-
sary condition for a REE to be considered plausible given that economic agents do not
posses of unlimited information processing capacity and knowledge. On the other hand,
the role of adaptive learning as a meaningful alternative to RE was investigated. Given
that subjective forecasting models satisfy an orthogonality condition, Muth’s assertions
for a consistent theory of expectation formation are met while the critique stemming
from the bounded rationality literature is simultaneously accounted for. In particular,
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the adaptive learning approach abstains from confounding an objective description of
reality with subjective perceptions of it. This certainly depicts a desirable feature.
However, if adaptive learning is regarded as an alternative to RE, rather than a plausibil-
ity check, then no rationale prevents the assumption of misspecified perceptions. While
Muth’s assertions still continue to hold in this environment, the theoretical attractive-
ness of the concept is decreased immensely. After all, the REH initiated a revolution
due to its universality of applicability. Adaptive learning, on the other hand, involves
an arbitrary component if the assumption of bounded rationality is taken one step fur-
ther. On grounds of this observation it might be tempting to choose the unambiguous
approach and assume the optimum rather than hypothesising about the right magnitude
of deviation from it.
The ME depicts an ambitious remedy to the arbitrariness inherent to the concept of
restricted perceptions. By endogenising the particular form of underparameterisation,
Muth’s claim for a consistent theory, being based on the principle of optimality, is
effectively accounted for. Yet, adaptive learning by means of restricted models, remains,
by definition, a supplemental concept rather than an alternative to RE.
Despite adaptive learning’s deficiency to impair the dominance of RE, the concept clearly
entails valuable ideas for policy recommendation. Consider one of the main implications
of the E-stability analysis, presented in this thesis: Optimal monetary policy should be
conditioned on private sector expectations rather than fundamental measures. If the
path of the economy is to be stabilised, possible deviations of the public’s prediction
from the ”rational” prediction must be accounted for. Adaptive learning, therefore,
not only provides an intuitive explanation for the importance of reacting to possibly
non-rational beliefs, but moreover provides a theoretical justification for the widespread
policy practise of inflation forecast targeting.
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Appendix A
Stochastic Approximation
The thesis introduced the idea of modelling agents as econometricians. Each period as
new data points enter the information set, parameter estimates of the PLM are updated
by Least Squares estimation. Whether the resulting dynamics asymptotically converge
to some equilibrium point can be studied by results of the stochastic approximation
literature. This chapter will concentrate on stability results for Least-Squares estima-
tion. However, a general formulation of recursive algorithms as well as conditions for
convergence shall also be presented.
A.1 The Robbins-Monro Algorithm
and Stochastic Gradient Learning
To introduce ideas on this issue, Robbins and Monro (1951) are followed in this section,
who were among the first to study stochastic approximation methods. They considered
the problem of finding a value for a vector x that solves the equation
M(x) = α, (A.1)
where M(x) denotes the expected value at level x of the response to a certain experiment
and α is some constant. A stochastic generalisation of this problem can be attained by
assuming that for each value x there is a random variable Y = Y (x) with cumulative
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distribution function P (Y (x) ≤ y) = H(y|x), so that
M(x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ydH(y|x).
While neither the exact nature of M(x) nor that of H(y|x) is known, it is assumed that
successive observations on Y at levels x1, x2 . . ., denoted by yt with P (yt ≤ y|xt) =
H(y|xt), can be made. Note that this problem is closely related to the regression
problem where under the assumption that M(x) is of known form, the parameters
θ = (β1, β2, . . . βn) in
E(Y |x) = θx, (A.2)
are estimated by Least-Squares on basis of observations {yt, xt}nt=1. However, instead of
estimating the parameter vector θ of M(x), under the assumption that the conditional
expectation is a linear function of x, the problem in this setup is to estimate a vector x
such that (A.1) holds.1
Robbins and Monro (1951) assume therefore that equation (A.1) has a unique solution,
that M(x) is non-decreasing in x and that there exist finite constants α and ϕ such
that
M(x) ≤ α for x < ϕ, M(x) ≥ α for x > ϕ. (A.3)
Then, given a sequence {γt} of non-increasing positive scalars, satisfying
∞∑
t=1
γt =∞ and
∞∑
t=1
γ2t <∞, (A.4)
Robbins and Monro prove that irrespective of the initial condition x1, the scheme
xt+1 = xt + γt(α− yt), (A.5)
determines a non-stationary Markov chain which converges to the solution of (A.1) in
the mean square sense, i.e. E(ϕ− xt)2 → 0 as t→∞.
The functioning of this algorithm is straight-forward to analyse: Any deviation of the
outcome from the target value results in an adjustment of the input. Assumption (A.3),
1Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1952) took up on this point and further developed the Robbins-Monroe
algorithm (A.5), as to find the maximum of a regression function M(x), whose form is unknown.
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directs each successive input towards the right direction. The speed of adaption is
governed by the ”gain” sequence {γt}. Convergence to the solution ϕ can only take place
if the noise produced by the random variable (α− yt), is paid less and less attention, i.e.
γt → 0 as t → ∞. Concurrently, assumption (A.4) guarantees that the gain sequences
does not decline too rapidly as to prevent convergence to a non-equilibrium point.
Robbins and Monro assumed that the function M(x) can be evaluated for any admissible
candidate as to find a vector x which satisfies (A.1) and proved that (A.5) succeeds in
doing so. Conversly, it is possible to use algorithm (A.5) in order to find a parameter
vector θ, under the assumption that the sample {xt} is generated by nature, as Sargent
(1993) notes. To see this, let yt follow the stochastic process
yt = θ¯xt−1 + t, (A.6)
where θ¯ = (β1, β2), x
′
t−1 = (1, wt−1) and t is an iid error term with zero mean. Assume
that agents correctly perceive that yt depends on xt−1 while they are not aware of the
specific form. Furthermore, suppose that agents are only concerned about minimising
their next period’s forecast error. Then, the vector θ = (βˆ1, βˆ2) will be determined such
that the first order condition for a minimum of E[(yt+1 − θxt)2], given by
E
[−xt(yt+1 − θxt)′] = 0,
is satisfied each period t. Clearly, this condition amounts to finding the roots of M(θ) =
α, for α = 0. Note that d/dθM(x) = xx′ is positive semidefinite and thus non-decreasing
in θ. Given that the variance of Y is finite, algorithm (A.5) can be applied to find the
unique root θ¯.
In period t, the latest observed forecast error, denoted by et−1, is given by
et−1 = −xt−1(yt − θ′t−1xt−1).
Inserting this expression into the Robbins-Monro algorithm (A.5) yields the following
learning rule
θt = θt−1 + γt
[
xt−1(yt − θ′t−1xt−1)
]
. (A.7)
Evans and Honkapohja (1998b) refer to the learning rule (A.7) as Stochastic Gradient
Learning. Note that the algorithm adjusts θ each period in the direction estimated to
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decrease the squared forecast error most rapidly. In contrast to Least Squares, however,
higher order moments of the distribution are neglected for which reason (A.7) is a gradi-
ent algorithm rather than a Newton-type algorithm as noted by Evans and Honkapohja
(2001).
As a particularly simple example, consider the case θ¯ = (1, 0). If agents correctly adapt
their PLM and choose an initial estimate x0 = 0 and a gain sequence γt = t
−1, then
(A.7) reduces to the recursive formulation of the sample mean.
It is worth emphasising that agents forecast did not have an effect on the distribution of
the variable agents were trying to predict in this example. This stands in stark contrast
to self-referential processes, like the New Keynesian model, where expectations feed
back into the system and thereby affect the distribution of observations. Consequently,
the results of Robbins and Monro (1951), despite being useful for illustration, are not
general enough as to analyse learning dynamics in economic models and in particular
for analysing Least Squares convergence.
A.2 Recursive Least Squares
The idea of econometric learning has been introduced in chapter 4 without explicitly
formulating the algorithm, agents are using as to update their parameter estimates.
This section will introduce Recursive Least Squares and therewith specify the dynamics
of the model. Defining the dynamics can be regarded as a preparatory step to analysing
convergence under Least Squares learning which will be discussed thereafter.
Under adaptive learning, the PLM is time dependent and takes the form
yt = at + btyt−1 + ctwt
Agents update their 2× 5 coefficients matrix θT = (aT , bT , cT ) in period T , by running
Least Squares on {yt, 1, yt−1, wt}T−1t=0 . This formulation is following the convention in
the learning literature to update coefficient estimates in period t by using information
available as of time t−1. Including current data would create a simultaneity complication
since the system would determine time t variables at the same time that agents are using
time t variables to form expectations.
Let Y denote the T × 2 matrix with i’th row y′i and X denote the T × 5 matrix given
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by X = (x0, x1 . . . xT−1)′, where xt = (1, y′t−1, w′t).2 The coefficient matrix θ minimising
the sum of squared residuals
(Y −Xθ′)′(Y −Xθ′),
is given by the Least Squares formula
θ′ =
(
X ′X
)−1
X ′Y.
Equivalently, this solution can be expressed in terms of the vectors xt and yt:
θ′T =
(
T−1∑
t=0
xtx
′
t
)−1(T−1∑
t=0
xty
′
t
)
.
To establish a recursive formulation of the estimate in period t, let the matrix of second
moments in period t− 1 be denoted by Rt−1 and given by
Rt−1 =
1
t− 1
t−2∑
i=0
xix
′
i,
so that Rt can be written recursively as
Rt = Rt−1 + t−1(xt−1x′t−1 −Rt−1). (A.8a)
Substitution of this expression into the Least Squares solution shows that the coefficient
matrix θt can be expressed as
θ′t =θ
′
t−1 + t
−1R−1t xt−1 (yt−1 − θt−1xt−1)′ . (A.8b)
Given some sequence of the state variables xt, the dynamics of the parameter estimates
θ are fully described by the recursive stochastic system (A.8). By incorporating informa-
tion on the most recent forecast error (yt−1−θt−1xt−1), the parameter matrix is updated
each period into the direction which minimises the sum of squared errors. The speed of
these incremental steps is governed by the matrix of second moments as well as by time.
2The assumption that observations x0 are available is made in order to express the recursive formu-
lation convenientely.
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Upon substitution of the T-map, the parameter estimate can be expressed as
θ′t =θ
′
t−1 + t
−1R−1t xt−1x
′
t−1 (T (θt−1)− θt−1)′ .
implying that the algorithm has a fixed point at T (θ) = θ, i.e. the REE.
A.3 General Recursive Algorithms and the ODE
Recursive Least Squares can be represented by the following quite general formulation
of a recursive algorithm, as presented by Ljung (1977) or Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
θt = θt−1 + γtH(θt−1, Xt), (A.9a)
Xt = A(θt−1)Xt−1 +B(θt−1)Wt. (A.9b)
Here, θt ∈ Rn is a vector of parameters which are the subject of interest and Xt ∈ Rm
is a vector of observations which causes θt to be updated to take new information into
account. In economic models (A.9a) corresponds to the learning dynamics while (A.9b)
corresponds to the (conditionally linear) state dynamics. A() and B() are matrix-valued
functions and Wt is an error vector.
34
Basic Results
To begin with, the basic results from the work of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) are
summarised here. Evans and Honkapohja consider an open set D ⊂ Rn around some
equilibrium point of interest and assume the following
A.1 The sequence {γt} is positive, nonstochastic, nonincreasing and satisfies
∞∑
t=1
γt =∞ and
∞∑
t=1
γ2t <∞
3In fact, both Ljung (1977) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) analysed more general formulations
of the algorithm. Ljung considered the case where the function Q is possibly time dependent and Evans
and Honkapohja considered the case when there is a second-order term present in (A.9a). For motivating
the associated differential equation, these assumptions are not necessary and therefore omitted.
4The Robbins-Monro algorithm can be seen to be a particular case when A() = 0.
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A.2 For any compact Q ⊂ D, there exist C and q such that for all θ ∈ Q
|H(θ, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|q)
A.3 For any compact Q ⊂ D, the function H(θ, x) satisfies for all θ, θ′ ∈ Q, x1, x2 ∈ Rm
and some constants L1, L2
(i) |∂H(θ, x1)/∂x− ∂H(θ, x2)/∂x| ≤ L1|x1 − x2|,
(ii) |H(θ, 0)−H(θ′, 0)| ≤ L2|θ − θ′|,
(iii) |∂H(θ, x)/∂x− ∂H(θ′, x)/∂x| ≤ L2|θ − θ′|,
As discussed in course of the Robbins-Monro algorithm, assumption A.1 is required as to
ensure convergence by neglecting noise asymptotically as well as to prevent convergence
to non-equilibrium points. Assumption A.2 imposes polynomial bounds on H(θ, x) and
assumption A.3 assures that H(θ, x) is twice continuously differentiable with bounded
second derivatives on every Q.
For the state dynamics Evans and Honkapohja (2001) impose the following assump-
tions:
B.1 Wt is iid with finite absolute moments.
B.2 For any compact subset Q ⊂ D it holds that
sup
θ∈Q
|B(θ)| ≤M and sup
θ∈Q
|A(θ)| < 1,
for some matrix norm |  | and a constant M . Furthermore A(θ) and B(θ) satisfy
Lipschitz conditions on Q.
For assumption B.2, Evans and Honkapohja remark that the condition on A(θ) is a little
stronger than asymptotic stationarity. However, if at some point θ∗ the spectral radius
satisfies r(A(θ < 1)), then the condition on A(θ) holds in a neighbourhood of θ∗.
Algorithm (A.9), being a time-variant, stochastic, nonlinear difference equation, appears
fairly complex to analyse. However, it turns out that under assumptions A and B, the
limiting behaviour of θt can be described by an associated differential equation which is
derived as follows.
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Some equilibrium point of interest θ is chosen and the corresponding state dynamics are
defined by
X¯t(θ) = A(θ)X¯t−1(θ) +B(θ)Wt. (A.10)
Given these state dynamics, the asymptotic influence on the parameter vector θ is anal-
ysed by considering
h(θ) ≡ lim
t→∞E[H(θ, X¯t(θ)], (A.11)
i.e. the asymptotic mean of H(θ, X¯t(θ)). The associated ordinary differential equation
(ODE), determining the limiting behaviour of the parameter estimate θt around θ, is
then given by
dθ
dτ
= h(θ). (A.12)
The essence of the work on stochastic approximation is that only locally stable equilib-
rium points of the associated differential equation (A.12) are possible convergence points
of the recursive algorithm. Conversely, the recursive algorithm (A.9) can not converge
to fixed points of (A.12) which are not locally stable. These conclusions are summarised
in Theorems 6.4 and 6.5 in Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
Consider an equilibrium point θ∗ with h(θ∗) = 0. Then, θ∗ is a possible convergence
point for the recursive algorithm (A.9) if and only if the linear differential equation,
H(θ∗) =
d
dθ
h(θ∗)
obtained from linearisation of (A.12) around θ∗, has all eigenvalues within the unit-circle
(see Ljung, 1977). The formal proof of these results is omitted here and the interested
reader shall be referred to Ljung (1977), Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) or Evans and
Honkapohja (2001). However, a heuristic justification, following Ljung (1977) and Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) shall be presented.
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Heuristic Justification
Solve the linear difference equation (A.9b) to see that observation Xt depends on all
previous estimates
Xt =
t∑
j=1
 t∏
i=j+1
A(θi−1)
B(θj−1)Wj . (A.13)
Clearly, the estimates can only converge to some equilibrium point if the process X is
exponentially stable. Given assumption B.2, the first terms in (A.13) will be very small
and for some M
Xt ≈
t∑
j=t−M
 t∏
i=j+1
A(θi−1)
B(θj−1)Wj .
However, as t increases, assumption A.1 and (A.9a) imply that the difference θt − θt−1
becomes smaller, such that for some t sufficiently large and t ≥ k ≥ t − 2M , it holds
that θt ≈ θk. Thus,
Xk ≈
k∑
j=1
A(θt)
k−jB(θt)Wj ≡ X¯(k; θt),
for t ≥ k ≥ t−M . This implies that H(θk−1, Xk) ≈ H(θt, X¯)(k, θt). Consequently, the
learning dynamics (A.9a) approximately follow
θt+s ≈ θt +
t+s∑
k=t+1
γkH(θt, X¯(k; θt)).
Now define h(θt) = EH
(
θt; X¯(k; θt)
)
so that H(θt, X¯(k; θt)) = h(θt) + wk where wk is
a random variable with zero mean. With this definition, the above expression can be
simplified to
θt+s ≈ θt + h(θt)
t+s∑
k=t+1
γk +
t+s∑
k=t+1
γkwk,
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≈ θt + h(θt)
t+s∑
k=t+1
γk (A.14)
where the second line follows since the last term is a zero mean random variable which
is dominated by the second term. This expression suggests that the limiting behaviour
of the sequence {θt} can be described by the difference equation
θ(τ + ∆τ) = θ(τ) + ∆τh(θ(τ)),
with ∆τ corresponding to
∑t+s
t+1 γk. Ljung (1977) then suggests to interpret this expres-
sion as a way of solving the differential equation
d
dτ
θ(τ) = h(θ(τ)) (A.15)
where the fictitious time τ relates to the original time t by τt =
∑t
k=1 γk.
5 As Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) note, the rigorous proof consists of finding and verifying the condi-
tions of validity for the approximately equal signs in this heuristic justification.
A.4 Application to Learning Rules
To illustrate the implications of this result, consider first the Stochastic Gradient learning
rule (A.7), of the preceding section which is restated here for convenience
θt = θt−1 + γt(yt − θt−1).
The estimate θ is single valued and the process yt is assumed to follow yt = a+t where 
is iid with zero mean. Note first that H(θt−1, Xt) is given by (xt− θt−1), in this example
and the state variable Xt is independent of θ. Hence, the results by Robbins and Monro
(1951) are sufficient as to guarantee convergence to the ”root” a. However, consider
the expected value of H, evaluated at the asymptotic stationary distribution of θ. This
5Note that (A.14) could also have been related to
θt+1 − θt = γt+1h(θt+1).
However, since the differential equation is time-invariant, it is easier to handle.
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yields the associated differential equation
d
dτ
θ = a− θ,
whose solution is
θ(t) = a+ e−t(θ(0)− a),
which converges to a for every initial condition θ(0). Since the objective is quadratic
and the distribution of yt was assumed to be invariant with respect to θ, there is global
convergence to the mean a.
Now consider Recursive Least Squares in the New Keynesian model. As to apply the
results of the stochastic approximation literature, the learning dynamics (A.8) have to
be converted into standard form. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) stress that it is therefore
necessary to make a timing change in the equation governing Rt. Thus, set St−1 = Rt,
so that the dynamics of the parameter estimates are described by the system
θ′t =θ
′
t−1 + t
−1S−1t−1xt−1x
′
t−1 [T (θt−1)− θt−1]′
St =St−1 + t−1
t
t+ 1
(xtx
′
t − St−1).
(A.16)
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that this system can be put into standard form
(A.9).
To derive the associated differential equation follow the steps which were outlined pre-
viously. Consider a REE corresponding to a fixed point θ¯ = (a¯, b¯, c¯) of T (θ) and assume
that the REE of interest is asymptotically stationary, i.e. the eigenvalues of b¯ are strictly
inside the unit circle.
Define the state dynamics for a particular point θ as xt(θ)
′ = (1, yt−1(θ)′, w′t) with
yt−1(θ) = T (θ)xt−1. Then xt(θ) is a stationary process for all θ sufficiently close to
θ¯.
Next, define Mx(θ) = E[xt(θ)xt(θ)′] and assume that S¯ = E[xt(θ¯)xt(θ¯)′] is positive
definite. Taking expectations and limits based on equations (A.16) yields the associated
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differential equations
dθ′
dτ
= S−1Mx(θ) [T (θ)− θ] ,
dS
dτ
= Mx(θ)− S.
From linearising this system at (θ¯′, S¯), Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that the
system is locally stable, provided the eigenvalues of DT (θ¯) have real parts less than
1. They remark that heuristically, this is evident since stability is governed by the
E-stability principle
dθ′
dτ
= T (θ)− θ.
when S →Mx(θ).
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Appendix B
Derivations
B.1 The Consumption Rule
Forward iteration of the budget constraint (2.3) gives
Wt ≥
∞∑
j=1
Rt,t+jPt+j
[
Ct+ji − Y it+j
]
,
where Rt,t+j is given by
Rt,t+j =
j∏
s=1
(
1
1 + it+s−1
)
.
and the No-Ponzi constraint limj→∞Rt,t+jWt+j+1 = 0, was used. Letting ω¯ = W it /(PtY¯ )
denote the share of a household’s real wealth as a fraction of steady state income Y¯ the
life-time budget constraint can be linearised as
Eit
∞∑
T=t
βT−tciT = ω¯
i
t + E
i
t
∞∑
T=t
βT−tyiT ,
Backwards iteration of the linearised Euler equation from date T to t and taking expec-
tations gives
Eitc
i
T = c
i
t − gt + Eit
[
gT + σ
T−1∑
T=t
(it − pit+1)
]
,
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which can be substituted into the linearised budget constraint to yield the optimal
consumption rule
cit = (1− β)ω¯it + Eit
∞∑
T=t
βT−t
[
(1− β)yiT − βσ(iT − piT+1) + β(gT − gT+1)
]
. (B.1)
B.2 Price Dispersion
This section follows Woodford (2003b) in deriving an approximation to the variability of
prices. Calvo pricing implies that the distribution of prices {Pt(j)} in period t consists
of α times the distribution of prices last period, plus an atom of size (1 − α) at the
price P ∗t . Letting Pˆt denote the expected value of lnPt(j), price variance may be written
as
var lnPt(j) = var[lnPt(j)− Pˆt−1]
= E[(lnPt(j)− Pˆt−1)2]− E(lnPt(j)− Pˆt−1)2
= αE[(lnPt−1(j)− Pˆt−1)2] + (1− α)(lnP ∗t − Pˆt−1)2 − (Pˆt − Pˆt−1)2
= α var lnPt−1(j) +
α
1− α(Pˆt − Pˆt−1)
2,
where the last line uses
Pˆt − Pˆt−1 = E[lnPt(j)− Pˆt−1]
= αE[lnPt−1(j)− Pˆt−1] + (1− α)(lnP ∗t − Pˆt−1)
= (1− α)(lnP ∗t − Pˆt−1),
By substitution of the log linear approximation Pˆt = lnPt, price dispersion may further
be simplified to
var lnPt(j) = α var lnPt−1(j) +
α
1− αpi
2
t . (B.2)
Integrating forward yields
var lnPt(j) = α
t+1 varP−1(j) +
t∑
s=0
αt−s
α
1− αpi
2
s ,
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where var lnP−1(j) denotes some initial price dispersion which is independent of policy.
Thus, taking the discounted value of these terms over all periods t > 0, one obtains
∞∑
t=0
βt var lnPt(j) =
α
(1− α)(1− αβ)
∞∑
t=0
βtpi2t + t.i.p. (B.3)
By substituting this expression into the linearised utility function (2.28) one finally
arrives at the normalised quadratic loss function
∞∑
t=0
βtUt = −Ω
∞∑
t=0
βt[pi2t + λ(xt − x∗)] (B.4)
where the relative weight on the output gap stabilisation is given by λ = κ/θ.
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Abstract (German)
Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist die Analyse von optimaler Geldpolitik, unter der Annahme, dass 
Erwartungen des privaten Sektors auf ökonometrischen Modellen beruhen. Adaptives Lernens 
wird als minimale, wenngleich notwendige Abweichung vom Konzept der Rationalen 
Erwartungen (Muth, 1960) dargestellt. Die Implikationen dieser Annahme werden für das "New 
Keynesian" Modell analysiert. Bedingungen werden charakterisiert unter welchen die 
kontinuierliche Aktualisierung der ökonometrischen Modelle und der damit verbundenen 
subjektiven Erwartungen zu einem Gleichgewicht Rationaler Erwartungen (REE) führen kann. 
Diese Bedingungen werden als notwendige Voraussetzung für die Plausibilität eines REE 
präsentiert und der Forderung nach Determiniertheit des Gleichgewichts gegenübergestellt. 
Aufgrund dieser Untersuchungen wird argumentiert, dass die Orientierung einer optimalen 
Geldpolitik an subjektiven Erwartungen, der Stabilität des Gleichgewichts förderlich ist. 
Abschließend wird die Relevanz einer transparenten Geldpolitik besprochen und in diesem 
Zusammenhang das Konzept des Gleichgewichts eingeschränkter Wahrnehmungen (Restricted 
Perceptions Equilibrium) erläutert.
Abstract (English)
This thesis investigates optimal monetary policy under the assumption that private sector 
expectations are based on econometric models. Adaptive learning is presented as a minimal 
deviation from the concept of Rational Expectations (Muth, 1960). Its implications for the 
dynamics of the New Keynesian model are analysed. Conditions are characterised under which 
the continuous updating of econometric  models and the hereby associated subjective beliefs 
may asymptotically lead to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). These conditions, which 
are evaluated as necessary for the plausibility of a REE, are compared with the requirement of 
determinacy. Based on these considerations it is argued that the orientation of optimal monetary 
policy on subjective expectations is conducive for the stability of equilibrium. Furthermore, in 
course of discussing the relevance of central  bank‘s transparency, the concept of a Restricted 
Perceptions Equilibrium is introduced. 
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